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Current general public-police encounters are reminiscent of a dialogue in J.R.R.
Tolkien's classic fantasy novel The Hobbit, in which a hobbit named Bilbo Baggins,
who lived under the ground, was visited by the wizard Gandalf. It was a sunny and
pleasantly peaceful day with plush green grass when Bilbo said, "Good Morning" to
the wizard Gandalf, and he meant it. Tolkien describes how the wizard looked at
Bilbo
from under long bushy eyebrows that stuck out further than the brim of
his shady hat [and asked], "What do you mean?" . . . Do you wish me
a good morning, or that it is a good morning whether I want it or not;
or that you feel good this morning, or that it is a morning to be good on?
"All of them at once", said Bilbo.'
Similar to the dialogue between the hobbit and the wizard, the rules governing
general public-police encounters are misleading, confusing, and susceptible to
numerous interpretations. The Supreme Court has stated that its confession law is
"murky and difficult," and that its search and seizure law is "intolerably confusing."'
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law, Miami; B.A. 1985, City
University of New York at Queens College; J.D. 1988, North Carolina Central University School of Law;
LL.M., 1992 Columbia University School of Law.
1. J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE HOBBrr 4 (Ballantine Books ed. 1966) (1937). (The Hobbit is the prelude
to Tolkien's trilogy The Lord of the Rings).
2. Craig M. Bradley, The Failure of the Criminal Procedure Revolution: A Response, 47 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 129 (1997) (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316 (1985) and Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. 420, 430 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring)).
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This position was echoed by Judge Harold Rothwax, a notable critic of the criminal
justice process, who contends that the rules governing general public-police
encounters are ambiguous and that both society and the police are reduced to "a
guessing game on the street and in the courtroom."3
Current general public-police encounter laws are of three types and are basically
governed by two seminal cases decided during the Warren Court era. The types of
encounters are voluntary, Terry stop and frisk, and arrest.4 The two seminal cases,
Terry v. Ohio5 and Miranda v. Arizona,' supposedly provide distinct and parallel
analyses in which Terry governs brief and minimally intrusive seizures and Miranda
governs custodial arrests. Through the years Terry stop and frisk practices have
shifted from a paradigmatic to a multifaceted stop and frisk resulting in an overlap
with the traditional Miranda analysis. The Miranda and Terry decisions, read
conjunctively, result in confusion and the line between a formal arrest and a Terry
stop and frisk becomes blurred.7 This blur is the result of the lower courts expansion
of the Terry decision and the Supreme Court's reliance on an artificial reasonableness
standard and colorblind constitutionalism.
The expansion of individual rights during the criminal pretrial process was the
benchmark of the Warren Court.! The Miranda custodial interrogation and Terry stop
3. JUDGE HAROLD J, RoTHwAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 237 (1996), He
especially criticizes how the criminal justice process has lost respect for the search for truth. See id. at
64.
4. See United States v. Cooper, 733 F.2d 1360, 1363 (10th Cir. 1984). The voluntary encounter is
communication without coercion or detention.
5. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
6. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
7. See generally United States v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967 (7th Cir. 1989) (describing the difficulty in
applying Terry).
8. The recognized rights include: the ban on cruel and unusual punishment, Robinson v. California,
370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); the right to effective assistance of counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963); the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11
(1964); the right to confroat and cross-examine witnesses, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400,407-08 (1965);
the right to speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967); the right to compulsory
process for obtaining witresses, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967); and, the right to trial by
jury, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 (1968). For a discussion on the topics of debate, see THE
WARREN COURT IN HISTRICAL AND POLmCAL PERSPECTIvE 7 (Mark Tushnet V ed., 1993); Francis
A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL
L.F. 518, 519. Former President Nixon stated that he wanted to rectify the Warren Court decisions that
ignored the interests in effactive crime control. See Albert W. Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections
on the Burger Court, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1436, 1441. (1987). The author notes that the anticipated
Burger Court counterrevolution to the Warren Court decisions never occurred. See id. The Burger Court
overruled, in part, Fay v. Nola, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) with Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). This
was the only case overruled, and, contrary to former President Nixon's intentions, the Burger Court
expanded the rights of criminal defendants. See Alschuler, supra, at 1441.
Ironically, the Warren Court itself created the overlap and confusion. In Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 767 (1969) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the Warren Court said all searches
and seizures require warrants and probable cause. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 767; Katz, 389 U.S. at 357-59.
However, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1966), the Warren Court stated that, although a frisk is a search,
the officer does not need probable cause. See id. at 20; see also Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of
Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CiuM. L. REV. 1123, 1126 (1996) ("The Warren court told
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and frisk standards form the vortex of the controversial debates related to the
constitutional rights of the individual? In this article, I attempt to address the debate
as it relates to the inadequacy of the Terry stop and frisk standard. In part I, I trace
the history of the Fourth Amendment, and suggest that a societal fear of crime has
prompted the Supreme Court to dilute the probable cause standard for a reasonable
suspicion standard for stop and frisk, i.e., search and seizures. I then provide an
overview of the Terry trilogy to demonstrate how the Supreme Court narrowly
defined the perimeters of a stop and frisk allowing for limited intrusion into an
individual's rights of privacy and dignity based upon reasonable suspicion. In part II,
I discuss the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment - reasonableness. I propose that
the reasonableness standard fails in several respects: it presupposes the existence of
a quintessential reasonable person; it is enforced in a biased manner primarily to
protect police without regard to individual rights; and, it fails to consider the
expansion of Terry stops to include greater police force. In part M, I discuss how
the reasonable person standard for Fourth Amendment searches and seizures is
particularly inappropriate for Black Americans. I suggest that the reasonable person
standard is insufficient due to selective race-based Terry stops which place Blacks
in custody during most police encounters. I provide several scenarios to illustrate this
point. My contention is that the Supreme Court has been amiss in remedying the
inadequacies of the search and seizure laws and has merely referred to an equal
protection remedy - which the Court has consistently refused to provide. I conclude
that the future of search and seizure laws are destined to become more confusing and
arbitrary unless the Court establishes rules and guidelines for the courts, police and
the general public in the spirit of the Fourth Amendment.
I. Background
A. Fourth Amendment Past and Present
The historical underpinnings of the Fourth Amendment are rooted in the American
Colonists' complaints against England in the late 1700s." The English Parliament
issued writs of assistance which allowed customs officers to search for smuggled
goods without judicial authorization and specified search limits." Customs officers
were empowered to conduct warrantless searches and seizures for illegal rum, slaves,
religious deviance, poaching, vagrancy, and evidence of tax evasion. The searches
us that the Fourth Amendment requires warrants and probable cause for all searches and seizures. But
in Terry v. Ohio, Chief Justice Warren himself, writing at the peak of his reign, told us that frisking is
a 'search' that does not require warrants or probable search.").
9. See Ralph Ruebner, Police Interrogation: The Privilege Against Self-lncrimination, the Right
to CounseL and the Incomplete Metamorphosis of Justice White, 48 U. MIAMI L. REv. 511, 513 (1994);
Reports and Proposals: Miranda Decision's Legitimacy, Effect on Law Enforcement Debated at ABA
Meeting, 59 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 1465 (Aug. 21, 1996); Paul G. Cassell, Rule of Law: How Many
Criminals Has Miranda Set Free? WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1995, at A15.
10. See JACOB W. LANDYNSIu, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 19 (1966).
11. See NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEvELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 54 (1937).
12. See William Cuddihy & B. Courman Hardy, A Man's House was not His Castle: Origins of the
1997]
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and seizures were pursuant to general warrants and writs of assistance, each of which
gave the officers unbridled discretion to search and seize. 3
Unbridled discretion fostered abuse on the part of the officers, and prompted
attorney James Otis to represent numerous Boston merchants in 1761 who were
subjected to arbitrary government searches and seizures. Otis argued that a man's
home is his castle and that the writs improperly lacked both accountability to a
neutral person and a particularity requirement which described the person, place or
thing searched or seized. 4 John Adams later claimed that Otis' remarks precipitated
the American Revolution. 5 Perhaps both Otis and Adams were correct because the
framers of the Fourth Amendment heeded Otis' warnings and feared an arbitrary,
capricious and overreaching government. 6 The framers sought protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures and required that judicial officers issue warrants
based upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describe
the place, person, or thing to be searched or seized. 7 Their worthy aspirations to
guarantee these protections produced two clauses in the Fourth Amendment.
The first clause of the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures, 9 while the second clause requires probable cause and particularity for
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 37 WM. & MARY Q. 371, 390 nn.84-85, 391
(1980).
13. The Navigation Act of 1662 directed officers to "go into any House, Shop, Cellar, Warehouse
or Room ... and in case of resistance, to break open Doors, Chests, Trunks, and other Packages, there
to seize and from thence to bring any Kind of Goods or Merchandise whatsoever, prohibited and
uncustomed." The Navigation Act of 1662, 13 and 14 Car.I1, ch.l 1 § 5 (1662), cited in ROBERT M.
BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 13 n.1 (2d ed.
1996),
14. See William W. Greenhalgh & Mark J. Yost, In Defense of the "Per Se" Rule: Justice Stewarts
Struggle to Preserve the Fourth Amendments's Warrant Clause, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1013, 1033
(1994).
15. See DARIEN A. IMCWI-RTER, SEARCH, SEIZURE AND PRIVACY 2 (1994).
16. The detrimental impact on the human psyche from an arbitrary, capricious and overreaching
government was describeJ1 by Justice Jackson 138 years after the adoption of the Fourth Amendment in
an opinion in which he wrote:
[The rights in the Fourth Amendment are not] mere second class rights but belong in the
catalog of indispensable freedoms. Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in
cowing a population, crushing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart.
Uncontrolled search and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the
arsenal of every arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and
worked among a people possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these
rights to know that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance
disappear where homes, persons and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded
search and seizure by the police.
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180-81 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
17. See Greenhalgh & Yost, supra note 14, at 1017-18.
18. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persbns, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. This clause safeguards the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary government
[Vol. 50:451
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warrants." Judicial interpretations of the Fourth Amendment vary and have
established two diametrically opposed models concerning the relationship between
the "reasonableness clause" and the "warrant clause" of the Fourth Amendment.
Proponents of the exclusive model construe the clauses as independent of each other
and hold that the probable cause requirement of the Fourth Amendment is limited to
searches with warrants.2 The opposing position, the inclusive model, asserts that
the warrant clause modifies the reasonableness clause, and therefore every search
must satisfy the particularity and probable cause requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.' This construction of the Fourth Amendment mandates that every
search and seizure is conducted pursuant to a valid search warrant, a warrant
exception, or probable causeY Both models reflect a perceived role of the criminal
justice system. The inclusive model is interconnected with the due process theory of
criminal justice, which focuses on the possibility of human error and the need to
protect individuals from state coercion and abuse' The focus is on human dignity
and autonomy. The exclusive model is interconnected with a crime control theory,
which places emphasis on the efficiency of the criminal justice process to investigate
crimes, apprehend suspects, adjudicate cases, and sentence after adjudication. Law
and order become the mechanisms to avoid societal breakdown from a loss of public
confidence in the criminal justice system.'
The Supreme Court has embraced the exclusive model, embedded in a crime
control theory, which has gained momentum from a societal fear of crime and illegal
drugsO The result is a transmutation of the framers' intent to protect the individual
from government intrusions to an emphasis on law and order, the drug war, and the
protection of one member of society from another." The Court, in its efforts to
intrusions. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes said the Fourth Amendment protects an individual's privacy rights, namely, the
right to be left alone. See 141 CONG. REC. H1314-01, H1321 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Scott) (quoting Justice Holmes).
20. This clause minimizes the possibility of unnecessary arrests. See Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 176 (1949).
21. See Jason S. Marks, Mission Impossible Rescuing the Fourth Amendment from the War on
Drugs, 11 CRIM. JUST. 16, 19 (1996).
22. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925). For a criticism of the interpretation
that the second clause modifies the first clause, see TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 23-24 (1969).
23. This Fourth Amendment protection is insulated in the exclusionary rule which bars the
admission of illegally obtained evidence in the interests of deterring unlawful police conduct. See Mapp
v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656-57 (1961). The exclusionary rule itself, however, has numerous exceptions.
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 926 (1984) (good faith); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 449-
450 (1984) (inevitable discovery); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 492-93 (1963) (attenuated
evidence).
24. See Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 14 (1964).
25. See id. at 9.
26. The fear of illegal drugs fosters a fear of crime and vice versa. See JAMES A. INCIARDI, THE
VAR ON DRUGS: HEROINE, COCAINE, CRIME AND PUBLIC POLICY 17 (1986).
27. There is a societal shift where legislation has become a means to protect one member of the
general public from another rather than from abuses by the state. For example, jurisdictions allow the
19971
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champion effective crime control, expanded the reasonableness clause of the Fourth
Amendment to allow government intrusions of an individual's privacy interests
without a warrant or probable cause s The contortion of the reasonableness clause
has its genesis, in part, in the Supreme Court's formulation in Terry v. Ohio of a stop
and frisk based upon reasonable suspicion.
B. Trilogy: Terry, Sibron, Peters
The stop and frisk procedure dates back to 1942 when several state legislatures
adopted the Uniform Arrest Act." The Act allowed police officers to stop and frisk
a person in public for weapons if there was reasonable ground to suspect that the
person was involved in a crime and posed a danger to the public t In 1967, the
police stop and frisk procedure was proposed by the American Law Institute, 2 a
seizure of juveniles pursuant to curfew statutes. Are such juvenile curfew statutes primarily enacted to
protect juveniles or to protect society from juveniles? For a discussion on this debate and the numerous
states with juvenile curfws, see William Ruefle & Kenneth Mike Reynolds, Curfews and Delinquency
in Major Cities, 41 CRIME & DELINQ. 347 (July 1995); Note, Curfew Ordinances and the Control of
Nocturnal Juvenile Crire, 107 U. PA. L. Rv. 66 (1958).
28. Professor Dressier has suggested that the Fourth Amendment was once considered a monolith,
and the monolith was cracked with Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and broken with
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 185
(1991). Both cases emphasized reasonableness rather than probable cause for searches and seizures. In
Camara, the Court decided that probable cause was based upon a reasonableness standard which weighs
the government intrusion against the individual's privacy interests. See Camara, 387 U.S. at 534-35. This
was a revolutionary approach which appears at odds with the framers' intent and attorney Otis' eloquent
speech to protect the Lights of the individual. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text for a
discussion about the framers' intent
29. The Supreme Court has established other exceptions to the probable cause requirement. See
Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (sobriety checkpoints); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325 (1985) (searches in public schools); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)
(inventory searches); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (border searches);
Schneckloth v. Bustarrionte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (consent searches); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971) (items seized in plain view); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) (searches
incident to a lawful ar'est); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative searches);
Warden v. Hayden, 3317 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)
(exigent circumstance&). In a sense, the exceptions have overwhelmed the rule. See Daniel L. Rotenberg,
On Seizures and Searches, 28 CREIG1-TON L. REv. 323, 323 (1995). The fear of crime and victimization
has prompted Housing Authority personnel to conduct warrantless sweep searches of low-income
Chicago housing projects. Such sweeps require neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion. See Pratt
v. Chicago Housing Auth., 848 F. Supp. 792, 793-94 (N.D. Ill. 1994); Lundy Langston, Sweep
Searches - The Rights of the Community, and the Guarantees of the Fourth and First Amendments:
Moms of the Chicago Public Housing Complex, Revisit Your Civil and Constitutional Rights and Save
Your Babies, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 259 (1996). For criticism of such sweeps, see Clayton E. Cramer,
The Racist Roots of Gun Control, 4 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 17 (1995); Monica L. Selter, Sweeps: An
Unwarranted Solution to the Search for Safety in Public Housing, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1903 (1995);
David E.B. Smith, Clean Sweep or Witch Hunt? Constitutional Issues in Chicagos Public Housing
Sweeps, 69 CHI.-K.Trr L. REV. 505 (1993); Steven Yarosh, Operation Clean Sweep: Is the Chicago
Housing Authority Sweeping Away the Fourth Amendment? 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1103 (1992).
30. See CHALRLES H. WHrrBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN
ANALYSIS OF CASES AND CONCEPTS 219 (3d ed. 1993).
31. See id.
32. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 2.02 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1966). The
[Vol. 50:451
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presidential commission," and numerous states.' The prerogative of the police to
deploy stop and frisk based upon reasonable suspicion was reviewed by the Supreme
Court for the first time in the 1968 case of Terry v. Ohio."
In Terry, Officer McFadden was patrolling downtown Cleveland, Ohio, at 2:30
p.m. in plain clothes and noticed two men standing on a street comer. McFadden
section provides:
(1) Stopping of Persons Having Knowledge of Crime. A law enforcement officer
lawfully present in any place may, if he has reasonable cause to believe that a felony or
misdemeanor has been committed and that any person has knowledge which may be of
material aid to the investigation thereof, order such person to remain in or near such place
in the officer's presence for a period of not more than twenty minutes.
(2) Stopping of Persons in Suspicious Circumstances. A law enforcement officer
lawfully present in any place may, if a person is observed in circumstances which suggest
that he has committed or is about to commit a felony or misdemeanor, and such action
is reasonably necessary to enable the officer to determine the lawfulness of that person's
conduct, order that person to remain in or near such place in the officer's presence for a
period of not more than twenty minutes.
(3) Action to Be Taken During Period of Stop. A law enforcement officer may require
a person to remain in his presence pursuant to subsection (1) or (2) of this section only
insofar as such action is reasonably necessary to
(a) obtain the identification of such person;
(b) verify by readily available information an identification of such person;
(c) request cooperation ....
(d) verify by readily available information any account of his presence or conduct or
other information given by such person.
(5) Search for Dangerous Weapons. A law enforcement officer who has stopped or
ordered any person to remain in his presence pursuant to this section may, if he
reasonably believes that his safety so requires, search such person and his immediate
surroundings, but only to the extent necessary to discover any dangerous weapons which
may on that occasion be used against the officer.
Id.
33. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
34. See WHITEBREAD & SLOBOGIN, supra note 30, at 219 (citing State v. Williams, 235 A.2d 684
(1967) and People v. Rivera, 201 N.E.2d 32 (1964)). The Rivera case was a judicial.effort to enforce
what was established in a New York statute which provided:
(1) A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably
suspects is committing, has committed or about to commit a felony [or other specified
crimes] ....
(2) When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this section
and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he may search such person
for a dangerous weapon ....
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 180a (McKinney Supp. 1967) (current version at N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 140.50
(1992)).
Numerous other states had also adopted stop and frisk legislation. See George E. Dix, Nonarrest
Investigatory Detentions in Search and Seizure Law, 1985 DUKE LJ. 849, 862 nn.93-110.
35. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Terry Court stated, "We would be less than candid if we did not
acknowledge that this question thrusts to the fore difficult and troublesome issues regarding a sensitive
area of police activity - issues which have never before been squarely presented to this Court." Id. at
9-10.
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testified that the men behaved suspiciously: they did not make eye contact with him;
they walked past a store and looked into the window approximately twenty times and
returned to the corner to confer with each other; and, after they were joined by a
third man the pacing, observing and conferring continued. McFadden suspected that
the men were planning a robbery, and approached to ask their names. He believed
the men were armed, and after they mumbled something in response to his inquiries
he spun Terry around and patted down the outside of his clothing. He felt a gun,
ordered the three men into the store, reached inside Terry's coat and removed a
pistol. Terry was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.
The Court held that the stop and frisk was reasonable and did not violate the
Fourth Amendment although Officer McFadden lacked both a warrant and probable
cause.' Chief Justice Warren conceded that a search and seizure of Terry had
occurred but indicatd that a narrowly drawn police authority permitted a search and
seizure without probable cause. An officer is not required to be absolutely certain that
the individual is armed.37 The stop is justified when the officer has reasonable
suspicion, based upon articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot. Furthermore,
a frisk is allowed if the officer reasonably believes that the person is armed and
dangerous.3
8
The Court decided Terry with the companion cases of Sibron v. New York"9 and
Peters v. New York&' The three cases formed the Terry trilogy. The appellants in
both the Sibron and Peters cases challenged a New York statute which permitted the
police to conduct stop and frisks.4' Appellant Sibron was observed continuously
from 4 p.m. to midnight by a New York City uniformed police officer. Sibron had
several conversations with numerous persons who were known by the police as
participants in an illegal drug trade. The officer was unable to hear the conversations
and did not notice an exchange of money or drugs. Sibron went into a restaurant
where he ordered pie and coffee, and while he was eating the officer approached
him, told him to accompany him outside and stated, "You know what I am after."
Sibron mumbled something in return and reached into his pocket while the officer
simultaneously reached into Sibron's same pocket. Sibron was convicted of the
unlawful possession of heroin found in his pocket.4
The Court held that the stop and frisk was unreasonable due to irfsufficient
evidence that the officer reasonably feared for his safety.43 His statement, "You
36. See id. at 28-30.
37. See id.
38. Justice Douglas in his dissent, agreed that Terry was seized and that a frisk is a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 35-38 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Therefore, he added,
a stop and frisk is constitutional only if there is probable cause that a suspect has committed or is about
to commit a crime. See id. (Douglas, J., dissenting).
39. 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
40. 392 U.S. 40 (1968). For a discussion on the Terry trilogy, see Dix, supra note 34, at 849;
Wayne R. Lafave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH.
L. REV. 39 (1968).
41. See supra note 34.
42. See id. at 44; Lifave, supra note 40, at 48-49.
43. See Sibron, 392 U.S. at 62-66.
[Vol. 50:451
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know what I am after," suggested he was searching for drugs rather than conducting
a protective frisk for weapons." Sibron's discussions with participants in an illegal
drug trade over an eight-hour period failed to justify an officer's reasonable fear of
life or limb to justify a stop and frisk because there was no indication that criminal
activity was about to occur or had occurred.45 The Court insightfully stated, "So far
as he [the officer] knew, they might indeed have been talking about the World
Series."
The final part of the trilogy was the Peters case, in which a New York police
officer was in his sixth floor apartment at 1 p.m. when he heard a noise and looked
through his peephole and saw two men tiptoeing toward the stairs. He thought they
were attempting to burglarize an apartment and when he opened and then slammed
his door, the two men ran. The officer pursued them and caught Peters on the stairs.
Peters said he was visiting a girlfriend, but refused to disclose her name because she
was married. The officer frisked Peters and detected an object which felt like a knife
in his pocket.47 It was an envelope containing burglar's tools. Peters was convicted
of possessing burglary tools with intent to use them in the commission of a crime."
The Court was undeterred by the fact that there was probable cause to arrest, and that
the burglar tools would have been discovered in a search incident to a lawful arrest.
It upheld the search and seizure of Peters as a lawful stop and frisk based on
reasonable suspicion.49 Peters was in a public place, the officer had reasonable
suspicion based upon articulable facts that criminal activity was afoot, and he
reasonably feared for his safety. His suspicion was based upon loud noises which
suggested a forced entry into an apartment, and strangers who tiptoed through the
hallway and fled when their presence was discovered.'
The Terry trilogy expanded the perimeter of the Fourth Amendment to allow a
stop and frisk, i.e., a search and seizure, based upon reasonable suspicion rather than
probable cause. The purpose of a stop and frisk is to allow an officer to pursue an
investigation without fear of violence, rather than a ruse to discover evidence of a
crime.5' The justification for the stop is based on a reasonable suspicion and is
justified by an objective manifestation of articulable facts suggesting that the person
stopped has committed, or is about to commit, a crime.' The frisk is strictly limited
44. See id. at 64.
45. See id. at 64.
46. Id. at 47.
47. See Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 49 (1968). A quarter of a century after the Terry trilogy,
the Court extended Terry stop and frisk procedure to allow an officer to reach into an individual's
clothing and seize anything reasonably believed to be contraband. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S.
366, 373 (1993).
48. See Peters, 392 U.S. at 48-50.
49. See id. at 66-68.
50. See id.
51. See Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). The Adams Court expanded Terry when it
found that the officer had reasonable suspicion although he was informed of criminal activity by an
informant's hearsay information about another person in a high crime neighborhood. See id. at 147. In
Terry, the officer's basis for reasonable suspicion was based on his own observation. See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1968).
52. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979);
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to what is reasonably necessary for the discovery of weapons, and the officer must
have an immediate safety concern 3 Each case in the Terry trilogy involved a minor
intrusion. However, since the trilogy in 1968, both the streets and the description of
a Terry stop have changed. The federal courts have shifted Terry stop and frisk from
the weaponless grab and spin in Terry, and the chase and apprehend in Peters, to
longer detentions ard increased police force.' This shift results from a piecemeal
case-by-case development of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence with insufficient
guidance from the Supreme Court which has repeatedly referred to a reasonableness
standard."
II. Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment
Whether a person is seized for Fourth Amendment purposes is based upon whether
a reasonable person would feel free to leave a police encounter' rather than a per
se rule which focuses on the particular individual or a rule which prohibits guns and
handcuffs during a Terry stop and frisk. Furthermore, the time frame for a Terry stop
and the force used must be reasonable. The officer must act reasonably in the manner
and scope of the detention.' In effect, the touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness."
Reasonableness is measured by the totality of the circumstances which emphasizes
a fact-specific inquiry rather than a bright-line rule. 9 The Supreme Court has
United Sates v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975). Terry was also expanded to allow the stop
and frisk of a person who committed a crime days earlier if the officer acts in objective good faith and
the intrusion is "reasonable". See United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227-29 (1985).
53. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 93-94
(1979); Terry, 392 U.S. at 26.
54. Certain "dangerous" offenses, people, and situations are automatically frisked although the
officer lacks reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the person is armed and dangerous. The
offenses include drugs, burglary and gambling related offenses. The "dangerous" people and situations
which have involved autb)matic frisk include companions of arrestees, persons present when the police
execute a warrant, and persons in a police car. See David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The
Withering ofTerry, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 22-32 (1994).
55. The Warren era was marked by the Supreme Court's effort to establish a national criminal justice
standard. Currently the Court has taken a back seat and allowed the state courts to control Fourth
Amendment issues. See generally Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The
Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEXAs L. REv. 1141 (1985) (debating the significance of the
experimentation on Fourth Amendment issues by state courts).
56. This is commonly known as the Mendenhall test because it was articulated by Justice Stewart
in United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
57. See Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note, "Special Needs" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception
Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 614 (1997).
58. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 930 (1995) (unanimously holding that the knock-and-
announce rule is part of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth Amendment); Florida v. Jimeno,
500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (concluding that it was objectively reasonable for the officer to conclude that
the suspect's consent to search included permission to search the closed containers in the car); Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 438-39 (1991) (refusing to adopt a per se rule that questioning aboard a bus
is a seizure); see also Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988) (refusing to adopt a bright-line test);
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (also refusing to adopt a bright-line test).
59. Although bright-line rules are inapplicable, a determination of reasonable suspicion to "stop and
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indicated that bright-line rules for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are contrary to
the Court's traditional contextual approach;' and that common sense and ordinary
human experience govern over rigid criteria' The rationale is that the police
encounter a multitude of situations which makes bright-line tests impractical. The
reluctance to adopt bright-line rules reflects the premise that law is something more
than a compilation of rules; laws govern life and the essence of life is change 2 In
Fourth Amendment analysis, the Supreme Court has rejected a bright-line test and
used a common-sense or reasonableness approach. Because the term "reason" has its
roots in Sir Edward Coke's assertion in the seventeenth century that reason is the soul
of the law,' his position has reinforced the legal profession's reliance on such terms
as reasonable time, reasonable price, reasonable mistake, reasonable care,'
reasonable good faith, 5 beyond a reasonable doubt, and the reasonable person
standard.
One is seized, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, if a reasonable person
believes he or she is not free to leave.' The reasonable person is the hypothetical
individual who implements "those qualities of attention, knowledge, intelligence and
judgment which society requires of its members ... ." The reasonable person
standard is used to determine whether an individual's conduct comports with the
beliefs and actions of the reasonable person.' The reasonable person test has its
limitations.
A. Limits of Reason
Reasonableness is considered as either an objective or subjective standard. The
objective standard focuses on the hypothetical reasonable and prudent person, and the
frisk" and for probable cause to make a warrantless arrest are both subject to de novo review. See
Omelas v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (1996).
60. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 572-73 (1988).
61. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985). The Fourth Amendment is governed by
terms which are not reducible to a neat set of rules. Such terms include reasonable suspicion and
probable cause. The terms derive their content from context, and proof of their existence is correlative
to what must be proved. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1989); Illinois v. Gates, 462
U.S. 213, 232 (1983); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 33 (1963).
62. This view was expressed by Roscoe Pound in his discussion of the difficulties in establishing
rules for the criminal Justice system. See ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 36 (1945).
63. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE: BERNHARD GOETZ AND THE LAW ON
TRIAL 39 (1988).
64. See id.
65. Good faith or reasonable belief is the basis for an exception to the exclusionary rule. See Yale
Kamisar, Gates, "Probable Cause," "Good Faith," and Beyond, 69 IOwA L. REv. 551, 585 (1984).
66. State v. Ochoa, 544 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Ariz. 1976).
67. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283(b) (1965).
68. The reasonable person standard impacts both criminal law and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
In criminal law, the mental state of the actor is significant because crimes generally require both an act
and mental state. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952); United States v. Fox, 95
U.S. 670, 680 (1878). The law of criminal self-defense is not focused on whether a person's belief is
correct, but rather whether the belief that force was necessary was reasonable. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.04 cmt. at 15 & § 3.09 cmt. at 77-79 (Tentative Draft No. 8, 1958).
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particular traits of the individual are irrelevant.' The opposing position is the
subjective standard which focuses on the mental state of the particular person. The
subjective standard analysis shifts from the reasonable and prudent person towards
an examination of the particular individual's state of mind." The subjective standard
places the fact-finder in the shoes of the individual, and the individual's beliefs are
examined from the mental and physical perspective of the individual.
The above objective and subjective standards are polar opposites, but tort law has
remedied the analytical shortcomings of adopting either view to the exclusion of the
other with an objective test for reasonableness which is partially subjective because
it includes a consideration of the qualities of the particular person!' This approach
is also adopted in the Model Penal Code for manslaughter. The Code provides two
elements to mitigate murder to manslaughter: (1) extreme mental or emotional
disturbance and (2) an objective/subjective test to determine the reasonableness of the
disturbance.' The Model Penal Code "objective" test for reasonableness has an
element of subjectivity which allows the fact-finder to look both at the reasonable
person and at the perspective of the particular individual. Therefore, while the
extreme emotional disturbance to mitigate murder from manslaughter must be
reasonable, the reasonableness is determined from the individual's viewpoint.
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, unlike tort law and the Model Penal Code,
establishes an objective test for seizure and solely examines whether a reasonable
person would feel free to leave a police encounter. Such an objective test is
impractical for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court's reliance on reasonableness as
the standard for the Fourth Amendment and its reluctance to adopt a bright line test
for Fourth Amendment searches and seizures is unworkable. It is unworkable
because the standard is enforced with bias, and reasonableness becomes difficult to
ascertain when lower courts have allowed greater force and longer detentions during
Terry stops. Second, the reasonable person is nonexistent because the general public
does not feel free to walk away from the police 3 The fear of the consequences of
walking away is particularly acute among Blacks who suffer a history of oppres-
sion. 4
69. See State v. Rodriguez, 460 P.2d 711,716 (Idaho 1969); People v. Cisneros, 110 Cal. Rptr. 269,
282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1973).
70. See State v. Adams, 641 P.2d 1207, 1209 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982).
71. See W. PAGE PROSSER Er AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 175 (5th
ed. 1984).
72. See MODEL PEN/,L CODE §210.3(I)(b) (1980).
73. See Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining When
Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. CRiM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 437, 439 (1988).
74. See Tracey Maclin, "Black and Blue Encounters" - Some Preliminary Thoughts about Fourth
Amendment Seizures: Shculd Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243 (1990) (asserting that black men
are taught at an early age to avoid challenging the police and that the there is always the possibility of
violence or humiliation).
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B. Limits of Reason - Bias
The Supreme Court could develop a per se rule that if guns and handcuffs are used
for a would-be Terry stop and frisk that both probable cause and a unique warning
are needed. The American Law Institute has offered a bright-line rule that an officer
provide any person stopped with the first two Miranda warnings before any
"sustained questioning."s Justice Marshall, in a concurring opinion, argued for a rule
that any detention longer than a few minutes, as mandated by Terry's brevity
requirement, is presumptively a de facto arrest.76 He stated, "[i]n my view, the
length of the stop in and of itself may make the stop sufficiently intrusive to be
unjustifiable in the absence of probable cause to arrest."' Justice Marshall's position
heeds the framers warnings of an arbitrary, capricious, and overreaching government
because his position places probable cause as the rule, rather than the exception, for
a valid search and seizure.
Despite the logical appeal of the above bright-line rules, it is unlikely that the
Supreme Court will adopt such bright-line rules because the Court has consistently
stated that bright-line tests are inimical to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Ironically, the Court's position has been inconsistent because it has adopted a
significant number of bright-line rules for the Fourth Amendment to ensure police
safety while providing minimal consideration of the framer's intent to protect the
individual against an arbitrary and capricious government.
In United States v. Robinson," an officer, based on his prior contact with the
defendant, believed that the defendant was operating a vehicle without a valid driver's
license. The officer stopped the defendant's car and ordered him and all of the
occupants out of the car. The officer then informed the defendant that he was under
arrest, and then searched him incident to that arrest. Inside the defendant's coat
pocket was a cigarette package which contained heroin. The Court held that a
cigarette package found on the defendant's person could be searched because no other
justification than an arrest is needed for a search.79 The officer did not need
probable cause, evidence of a weapon, or any other justification to conduct the
search incident to the lawful arrest.' The Court established the bright-line rule that
the arrest itself justifies the search."1
The Court later expanded the search incident to an arrest bright-line rule
enunciated in Robinson to justify a search beyond the area in control of the person
lawfully arrested. In New York v. Belton,' when an officer stopped the defendant's
car for speeding, he smelled burnt marijuana and noticed an envelope on the floor
75. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(5) (1975).
76. See generally United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 689 (1988) (Marshall, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 692 (Marshall, J., concurring). He also stated that "Terry 'stops' are justified, in part,
because they are stops, rather than prolonged seizures." Id. (Marshall, J., concurring).
78. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
79. See id. at 235.
80. See id.
81. See id. at 236.
82. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
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marked "supergold". The four occupants of the car, none of whom owned the car,
were told to get out of the car and were arrested for marijuana possession. The
officer separated the men into four different areas and searched them. After he
searched them, and while they were some distance from the car, he searched the car's
interior. The Court held that Chimel v. California applied and adopted a bright-line
rule which allows a search of an automobile's interior if the search is incident to a
lawful arrest.' A search of the car did not require probable cause, reasonable
suspicion, or risk of harm to the officer or the general public. Instead, as a bright-line
rule, the Court held that the officer merely needed a lawful arrest for the subsequent
search of the car's interior, even though the officer had separated the men and moved
them away from the car.'
Other bright-line rules for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence arose out of the
Pennsylvania v. Mimms' and Maryland v. Wilson" decisions. The two decisions
establish a bright-line rule which enables an officer to order occupants out of a
lawfully stopped car, regardless of whether the occupant of the car is a driver or
passenger, even without probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe that any
passenger has committed or is about to commit a crime. The Court balanced the
individual's liberty interest when the car is already legally stopped against the
officer's safety and decided that a bright-line rule was appropriate to protect the
police. In the same term that the Court decided Wilson, it also held in Ohio v.
Robinette' that the police can search a person's car without first telling the person
that he or she is free to leave."
The Court has, in effect, established several bright-line rules for Fourth
Amendment searches and seizure. The rules were designed to protect the police. This
premise of protecting, the police has also allowed the police to use greater force
during a Terry stop.
C. Limits of Reason - Increased Force
The description of a stop and frisk articulated in the Terry trilogy has expanded
from a paradigmatic to a multifaceted stop and frisk. The multifaceted expansion is
primarily due to the crimes, violence and death associated with illegal drug usage.'
83. 395 U.S. 752 (1969). The Court in Chimel overruled the case-by-case reasonableness standard
from United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), and established a "lunge" rule which confines a
search incident to a lawfiul arrest to areas in which an arrestee could reach for weapons or destroy
evidence. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762-63.
84. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460.
85. See id.
86. 434 U.S. 106 (1977). In Mints, the driver was ordered out of the car. See id. at 884.
87. 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997). In Wilson, the passengers were ordered out of the car. See id. at 884.
88. 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
89. See id. at 419.
90. The highest arrest rates in the United States for 1993 were for driving under the influence,
larceny, simple assault and drug abuse (each exceeding one million). See FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEr,' OF JusTcE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1993). In 1989, possessors and
traffickers represented roughly 20% to 24% of the 395,553 inmates of the nation's county and municipal
jails and an estimated 25% to 35% of the 710,054 convicts serving sentences in the state and federal
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The war on drugs has influenced the federal courts to expand Terry from a brief and
minimally intrusive search and seizure into detentions which involve greater police
force, guns, lengthy detentions, and handcuffs.' The federal courts' expansion of
Terry, coupled with the Supreme Court's contraction of Miranda,9 has created an
overlap of the rules governing the Miranda and Terry decisions.
In United States v. Taylor,93 defendants Taylor and Pressler were convicted of the
conspiracy to manufacture and attempt to manufacture amphetamines. Defendant
Taylor was involved in the operation of amphetamine laboratories for several years
and his co-conspirator, Pressler, assisted in the purchase of precursor chemicals from
chemical supply companies.9 Agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
obtained a warrant to place a beeper inside a box of chemicals ordered by Pressler.
The box was initially transported to Taylor's sister's house, and later to his house -
a routine Taylor frequently followed. The DEA agents obtained warrants to search
both houses, and in his sister's house they found receipts for various chemicals. 95
A search of Taylor's house necessitated a closing off of his neighborhood to avoid
the public's exposure to dangerous chemicals.' The agents disguised themselves as
fire fighters, informed the residents that a propane truck had overturned, and asked
them to evacuate the area. Taylor and Pressler were in Taylor's truck and were
prisons. Drug prohibition forced our penal institutions to warehouse somewhere between 260,000 and
343,000 people who otherwise would not have burdened the system. If we add those who were
imprisoned not for drug crimes but for drug-related crimes (such as crimes to get money, or murders and
assaults arising out of the drug business), we could include another 150,000 to the total. In sum, half of
the penal population is there from drug related charges. See Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug
Prohibition and the Weakness of Public Policy, 103 YALE UJ. 2593, 2611 (1994) (reviewing STEVEN
B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GRos, AMERIcA'S LONGEST WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST
DRUGS (1993)). The nature of a Terry stop will undergo further challenges from the spread of drugs and
the advancement of technology which will enable the police to scan citizens from yards away with
electronic devices with electromagnetic emissions and ascertain whether the person has a concealed
weapon. See Erik Milstone, New Devices Let Frisks Go Undercover, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1996, at 32.
91. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703-04 (1983) (demonstrating influence on courts of
the war on drugs); see also Andrew J. Purcell, Comment, Feeling Violated: Seventh Circuit Puts the
Squeeze on Fourth Amendment Right of Bus Travelers, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 245 (1997) (discussing
luggage searches conducted in an effort to locate illegal drugs).
92. In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the Court stated, "[i]n recognizing a narrow
exception to the Miranda rule in this case, we acknowledge that to some degree we lessen the desired
clarity of that rule. At least in part in order to preserve its clarity, we have over the years refused to
sanction attempts to expand our Miranda holding." Id. at 658 (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S.
420 (1984)); see also Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (refusing to extend rights to counsel under
Miranda to request to see probation officer); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976) (permitting
no expansion of Miranda right to noncustodial interviews).
93. 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1983).
94. See id. at 704. Many of the precursor chemicals are obtainable over-the-counter from chemical
supply companies. In fact, 33% to 50% of the revenues for chemical supply companies are generated
from the sale of precursor drugs that companies know are illegally sold. See Omar Saleem, Killing the
Proverbial Two Birds with One Stone: Using Environmental Statutes and Nuisance to Combat the Crime
of Illegal Drug Trafficking, 100 DICK. L. REV. 685, 698-99 (1996).
95. See Taylor, 716 F.2d at 705.
96. The chemicals used in clandestine drug laboratories pose a danger of toxicity, ignitability,
corrosivity, and explosivity. See id. at 698.
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stopped by the agents a few yards from Taylor's house. Taylor, who was known by
the police as armed and dangerous, approached the agents and asked why the fire
trucks were in the area. The officers drew their guns and arrested Taylor while
Pressler sat in the front passenger seat of the truck. The officers ordered Pressler
to raise his hands, but he moved surreptitiously and failed to comply after three such
demands. He was handcuffed, frisked, and forced to lie face down in a ditch for
approximately three to five minutes.9"
Pressler's detention necessitates an inquiry into whether the force used by the
police to detain was a Terry stop and frisk or a custodial arrest.99 The Terry
decision involved a brief and minimally intrusive stop and frisk. Terry was simply
grabbed, spun around, and his outer garment was patted down. In Terry, Officer
McFadden did not draw his gun during the detention of Terry and his accomplices
who were suspected of planning to commit a robbery." Officer McFadden
handcuffed Terry after he arrested him. Paradoxically, Pressler's detention involved
drawn guns, handcuffs, and lying face-down in a ditch for approximately three to five
minutes."' The TayLgr Court held that neither handcuffs nor forcing a suspect to
lie face down at gun point transforms a Terry stop and frisk into an arrest."° The
rationale was that the use of handcuffs and guns was reasonable because Pressler
failed to obey orders to raise his hands, made furtive movements inside the truck, and
because of the low ratio of police to suspects. °" The court found that the interests
in effective law enforcement outweighed the individual's liberty and privacy
interests,0 4 and that the stop and frisk of Pressler was reasonable at its inception
and in its scope."
The enlargement of a Terry stop and frisk to include drawn guns and handcuffs
depicts the ambiguity of the permissible scope of a Terry stop and frisk and the
current insufficient framework to distinguish a stop and frisk from an arrest. There
is a lack of guidance about where a Terry stop and frisk ends and a full custodial
arrest begins. Clarity is important lest the police arrest individuals based on
reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause. The lack of clarity conflicts with the
constitutional protections of the Fifth and Fourth Amendments, and the police and
general public have difficulty in determining whether an encounter is a stop and frisk
or a custodial arrest.
97. See id. at 705.
98. See id. at 709.
99. See id. at 706-0).
100. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1968).
101. See Taylor, 716 F.2d at 709.
102. See id.
103. See id. In Taylor, there were two suspects and two or three police officers. See id. at 708.
104. An individual's assertion of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures requires a legitimate privacy interest. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring). Such interests exists when the person has an actual subjective expectation of
privacy, and society recognizes that expectation as reasonable. See id. (Harlan, J. concurring).
105. See Taylor, 716 F.2d at 707-09.
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In United States v. Griffin,"° the defendant transported cocaine from Houston,
Texas, to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. The Oklahoma City Police received
information which led them to believe that Ms. Griffin fit the "drug courier
profile," °" because she and another woman frequently bought one-way tickets a few
minutes before their flight departed and paid cash for their tickets."8 Ms. Griffin
passed through the airport security gate and the security personnel discovered bullets
in her purse. She was escorted to a briefing room where she consented to a search
of her luggage which alerted a drug detection dog to the scent of a controlled
substance."° Ms. Griffin and her companion were told that they were free to leave,
but the police requested time to count the cash inside the luggage which totaled
$38,500."' The police lacked probable cause to arrest,"' and again told the
women they were free to leave. Another officer entered the briefing room and asked
Ms. Griffin if he could speak with her. She agreed to speak with him, and they went
into his private office where he repeatedly asked about the source of the money. She
admitted the money was drug related, told him drugs were in her car, and consented
to a search of her purse which contained six hundred dollars."' The officer then
drove Ms. Griffin to her car, where he obtained written consent to search, and found
cocaine in the glove compartment of her car. She was convicted of numerous drug
related charges and sentenced to four concurrent life sentences."' On appeal, Ms.
Griffin argued that she was in custody from her initial encounter with the police, and
that all the evidence should be suppressed because she was not given Miranda
warnings."" The court agreed and held that a reasonable person in Ms. Griffin's
situation would have understood herself to be in custody and not free to leave."'
106. 7 F.3d 1512 (10th Cir. 1993).
107. See id. at 1514-15. Four years earlier, the Supreme Court acknowledged the "drug Courier
profile" as an articulable fact, which taken together with natural inferences from those facts, creates a
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot to justify a stop and frisk. See United States v.
Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,10 (1989). This case also extended Terry to allow for reasonable suspicion based
upon the person's appearance. See id.
108. See Griffin, 7 F.3d at 1514.
109. See id.
110. See id. at 1514-15.
111. The presence of drug-tainted money is insufficient for probable cause. In United States v. U.S.
Currency, 39 F.3d 1039 (9th Cir. 1994), the defendant had bills in denominations of $5, $10, $20, $50,
and $100 for a total of $30,060. A narcotics detections dog indicated the bag of money carried the scent
of a controlled substance. The court found probable cause was lacking and denied forfeiture of the
money. See id. at 1041. It relied upon a study conducted by the defense which indicated 75% percent
of all currency in the Los Angeles area was tainted with residue of cocaine or some other controlled
substance. See id. at 1043. The percentage of money tainted with residue from a controlled substance
ranged from 10% to 15% percent in Bozeman, Montana, to 75% in Los Angeles and Las Vegas. See id.
at 1041-43; see also Mark Curriden, Courts Reject Drug-Tainted Evidence, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1993, at 22
("The mere presence of trace amounts of cocaine on a common object ... is insufficient to support a
felony conviction for possession of cocaine.").
112. See Griffin, 7 F.3d at 1515.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 1516.
115. See id. at 1519.
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Ms. Griffin's subjective belief was relevant because it is central to the inquiry and
analysis used to categorize the nature of her encounter with the police. When the
police and a member of the general public engage in a discussion, while the officer
is engaging in an official duty, the "stop" of that person may be characterized as
voluntary, a Terry stop and frisk, or an arrest."6 A voluntary general public-police
encounter is a communication without coercion or detention. The person is free to
ignore the officer and walk away. Unlike a stop and frisk or an arrest, a level of
suspicion is not required. Both stop and frisk and arrests are seizures, but the former
requires reasonable suspicion and the latter requires probable cause."'
A seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and custody for purposes of
Miranda both involve restraint on a person's freedom to walk away from the
police."' The Supreme Court has attempted to distinguish the Fourth Amendment
seizure from Miranda-type custody."9 A person is in custody for purposes of
Miranda when there is a formal arrest or restraint of movement associated with
formal arrest." Thi, inquiry of whether a person is seized for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment is based upon "whether a reasonable person would feel free to
decline the officer's request or otherwise terminate the encounter."''
Theoretically, a Terry stop and frisk is a brief and minor inconvenience and a
minor indignity, while a custodial arrest is a police-dominated atmosphere in which
the person is removed from a familiar environment, surrounded by antagonistic
forces, subjected to persuasion techniques, and entitled to Miranda protections."
The current practice among federal courts of allowing greater police force has placed
Terry stops into police-dominated atmospheres with antagonistic forces similar to
custodial arrests." Although the Griffin court decided that Ms. Griffin's detention
in the airport was a custodial arrest rather than a Terry stop,'" the standard for
custody, for purposes of Miranda, yields inconsistent results. In Taylor, the defendant
Pressler submitted to police authority when the police used guns, handcuffs, and
ordered him to lie face-down in a ditch for three to five minutes."u Pressler's
detention met the standards for both the Fourth Amendment seizure and the Fifth
Amendment custody requirements." A reasonable person in Pressler's situation
would not feel free to leave, and his detention was more associated with a formal
arrest because there were several officers, guns were drawn and Pressler was
116. See id. at 1516.
117. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-31 (1968).
118. See Richard Williamson, The Virtues (And Limits) of Shared Values: The Fourth Amendment
and Miranda's Concept of Custody, 1993 U. ILL. L. REv. 379, 384 (citing United States v. Brunson, 549
F.2d 348, 357 n.12 (5th Cir. 1977).
119. See Buffaloc, spra note 56, at 614.
120. See Berkernier v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984). California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121,
1125 (1983) (quoting Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977).
121. See Florida v. Bostick, 50 U.S. 429, 436 (1991); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984).
122. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983).
123. See Buffaloc, supra note 56, at 614.
124. See United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1993).
125. See United States v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701, 709 (9th Cir. 1983).
126. See id.
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handcuffed face-down in a ditch." The Court decided that Pressler's detention was
more similar to a stop and frisk than to an arrest because the force used was
reasonably necessary and reasonably limited and that the Miranda standard simply
did not apply."
The court's position in Taylor that an arrest is more lengthy, intrusive, and police-
dominated than a Terry stop and frisk is inaccurate because numerous federal courts
have allowed handcuffs and drawn guns for a lawful stop and frisk." Police are
allowed to use force increasingly different from a paradigmatic Terry stop and frisk
when such force is deemed necessary and reasonable to maintain the status quo and
to protect the officer and the general public."3 The force includes a display of
weapons and the use of handcuffs when reasonably related to the circumstances, even
though the police lack probable cause.'
A contrary position was adopted by the Seventh and Tenth Circuit decisions of
United States v. Smith' and United States v. Perdue,' which have held that the
use of handcuffs and guns transforms a stop and frisk into a custodial arrest which
requires Miranda warnings." In Smith, clerks at a hotel notified the police that
they suspected drug activity in one of their hotel rooms and the police set up
surveillance to observe the hotel. 3 After Smith checked out of the hotel, the
officers followed the taxi. The officers stopped the taxi, ordered the occupants out
of the taxi, and one officer held his gun at his side. Smith, who was one of six
occupants in the taxi, was removed from the taxi, handcuffed and seated on the grass
on the roadside." He was questioned and drug paraphernalia was discovered in his
127. See id.
128. See id. at 708-09.
129. See United States v. Saffeels, 982 F.2d 1199 (8th Cir. 1992) (handcuffs), vacated 510 U.S. 801
(1993); United States v. Miller, 974 F.2d 953 (8th Cir. 1992) (handcuffs); United States v. Clipper, 973
F.2d 944 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (guns drawn); United States v. Esieke, 940 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1991) (handcuffed
and confined with leg irons); United States v. Jackson, 918 F.2d 236 (1st Cir. 1990) (guns drawn);
United States v. Lane, 909 F.2d 895 (6th Cir. 1990) (guns drawn); United States v. Alexander, 907 F.2d
269 (2d Cir. 1990) (guns drawn); United States v. Crittedon, 883 F.2d 326 (4th Cir. 1989) (handcuffed);
United States v. Hastamorir, 881 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1989) (guns drawn and handcuffs); United States
v. Taylor, 857 F.2d 210 (4th Cir. 1988) (guns drawn); United States v. Kapperman, 764 F.2d 7861 (1 1th
Cir. 1985) (handcuffs); United States v. Perate, 719 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1983) (guns drawn); United States
v. Taylor, 716 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1983) (handcuffs); United States v. Roper, 702 F.2d 984 (11th Cir.
1983) (guns drawn); United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286 (9th Cir.1982) (handcuffs); United States
v. Seni, 662 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1981) (guns drawn); United States v. White, 648 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(guns drawn); United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1977) (guns drawn); United States v.
Worthington, 544 F.2d 1275 (5th Cir. 1975) (guns drawn); United States v. Williams, No. 91-3097, 1992
WL 308584 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 6, 1992) (handcuffs).
130. See Buffaloe, supra note 56, at 614.
131. See id.
132. 3 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 1993).
133. 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).
134. Approximately a decade earlier, the Supreme Court indicated that a individual is in custody
when surrounded by four police officers, handcuffed and questioned. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S.
649, 655 (1984).
135. See Smith, 3 F.3d at 1091.
136. See id. at 1092.
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belongings. The appellate court held that the stop and frisk was justified, but that
Smith should have been advised of his Miranda rights because the officers
outnumbered the suspects and Smith was not free to leave when he was frisked,
handcuffed, and told to sit in a specific place.'37
Similarly, in Perdue, the court held that Miranda rights are required when police
detain a suspect with force more traditionally associated with an arrest."' In Perdue,
two helicopters and fifteen to twenty police officers searched a metal building in rural
Kansas pursuant to a search warrant. They found 500 marijuana plants, drug
paraphernalia and a loaded pistol.'39 While the officers were conducting the search,
they noticed a car approach the building, stop and reverse its direction. The officers
immediately became suspicious, drew their guns and ordered defendant Perdue and
his fiancee to get out of the car and lie face down on the ground." Perdue's
fiancee was unable to comply because she was pregnant. Perdue was handcuffed, and
while lying on the ground he was asked why he was on the property. He stated he
was there to "check on his stuff." When asked, "What stuff?" he replied, "The
marijuana that I know you guys found in the shed.''. He was directed to another
police officer who informed him of his Miranda rights. A forty-minute interrogation
followed, and while his pregnant fiancee was visibly upset, Perdue made
incriminating statements. The court held that although the initial stop may have been
a lawful Terry stop and frisk, Miranda warnings were necessary during both
interrogations because the officer forced the suspects at gun point to stop the car and
answer questions, thereby placing them in formal custody.""
Griffin, Taylor, Smith, and Perdue demonstrate that the increased police force used
in Terry stops has made it difficult to distinguish a custodial arrest from what is
termed a Terry stop and frisk. The police and general public are unable to accurately
determine the difference between a Terry stop and an arrest. The use of police guns
and handcuffs is a Terry stop for one court and an arrest in another.
The difficulty in distinguishing a Terry stop from an arrest becomes more
pronounced when th. increased force is supplemented with other stops which involve
an increase in the length of time for detentions. For example, in United States v.
Sharpe,'" the Court allowed a twenty-minute detention of a motorist on a public
highway, and declined to establish a bright-line test between an investigative stop and
frisk and an arrest. 4 The twenty-minute detention was permissible because it was
held reasonable as to manner, method, and purpose.'" The Terry Court's emphasis
137. See id. at 1091-93.
138. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464.
139. See id. at 1458.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 1459.
142. See id at 1459-60, 1463-65.
143. 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
144. See id at 687-38.
145. See id.; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 n.10 (1983) ("[Wle question the
wisdom of a rigid time limit. Such a limit would undermine the equally important need to allow
authorities to graduate their responses to the demands of any particular situation."). But see MODEL CODE
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on brevity" and minor inconvenience - to protect the privacy and dignity of the
individual - has succumbed to concerns of whether the officer acted diligently and
reasonably - a standard courts decide on a case by case basis. 47 The focus on
reasonableness rather than personal autonomy and dignity has resulted in an
expansion of Terry to allow a lengthy detention if the police act diligently and
reasonably during a Terry stop and frisk.'" The amount of force and the length of
a detention are more problematic when the drug and race issues are intertwined.
D. Limits of Reason - Race and Police Encounters
Along with the failures of the Supreme Court to adopt an objective bright-line test
for searches and seizures - except for police safety"49 - and in providing insuf-
ficient guidance to lower courts concerning the permissible amount of force for a
Terry stop, the Court has also failed to acknowledge the significance of the drug war
and racial discrimination when it distinguishes a stop and frisk from a custodial
arrest."' The American drug problem incites a social insensitivity to "those people"
who are perceived as the source of the problem, particularly where the majority of
OF PREARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2(5)(a)(ii) (Proposed Official Draft 1975) (suggesting that a
detention not exceed twenty minutes).
146. Justice Brennan dissented, in part, to the Sharpe decision because the detention violated Terry's
brevity requirement. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 711 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
147. See 7Wenty-third Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and
Courts of Appeal 1992-1993, 82 GEO. L.J. 597, 632-33 (1994). Detentions of 30 minutes, one hour, and
two hours have been held to be reasonable. See id. at 633-34 n.137.
148. See Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 688; see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 234-35 (1985)
(finding that an arrest is valid if the arrest would have been made by an experienced law enforcement
officer); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-13 (1979) (finding that Fourth Amendment seizures
are reasonable only if they derive from probably cause); United States v. Elsoffer, 671 F.2d 1294, 1295-
96 (1Ith Cir. 1982) (describing an airport detention which became an arrest due to duration of detention).
149. An exception to this exception is an opinion by Justice Stevens where the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment does not permit a blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for felony
drug cases necessitated by the violence and dangers of the illegal drug culture. See Richards v. Wisconsin,
117 S. Ct. 1416, 1421 (1997). Justice Stevens refused to establish a brightline rule which would allow a
no-knock entry when drugs are involved. Instead, he maintained a case-by-case reasonableness standard
and stated that "[i]n order to justify a 'no-knock entry', the police must have a reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing their presence.., would be dangerous or futile ..... Id.
150. In its discussion of race, the Terry Court regulated the significance of race to a sentence and
a footnote when it mentioned that it was argued that a stop and frisk may exacerbate the tension between
the police and Black communities because Black communities have been traditionally harassed by the
police. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12, 14 n.l1 (1968). The solution, according to the Court, is found
in the various courts monitoring the police and enforcing the exclusionary rule. See id. at 15. Neither
of these proposals serve as a solution because courts give more weight to police than to a suspect's
testimony, and the exclusionary rule - with already more than twenty exceptions - applies after a
person's rights are already invaded. See David A. Harris, Frisking Every Suspect: The Withering of
Terry, 28 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 1, 32-36 (1994); see also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 120[B], at 241 (1991) (explaining that the exclusionary rule has little effect on the
behavior of law enforcement personnel).
1997]
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
the general public perceive the police as fair.' and the violation of a right as a
necessary harm to win the war on drugs."
The possession, distribution and sale of illegal drugs have ushered in an era of
violence and despair. The corollary of illegal drugs is a societal fear of crime.' It
also has led those involved in the illegal drug trade to commit crimes for retribution
or money to purchase drugs. 54 The increase of drug-related crimes'55 has
increased the number of criminal suspects who use guns," which in turn has
justified the expansion of the Terry stop and frisk.t" Unfortunately, the willingness
151. In a 1995 survey structured to report the level of confidence in the police, participants were
asked "[hlow much confidence you, yourself, have in... the police?" The choice of answers was: a
great deal, quite a lot, or very little. When organized along racial lines, the percentage of people who
answered "a great deal" and "quite a lot" was as follows: White 63%; nonwhite 30%; Black 26%. See
KATHLEEN MAGUIRE & ANN L. PASTORE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS - 1994, at 147 (1995).
152. The invocation of a right is perceived as a game in which the suspect wants to "beat the
system," or a right is pa-t of a cost-benefit analysis and the individual's right gives way to a so-called
public good. See RoTHY/AX, supra note 3, at 38-40 (arguing that criminals are simply going free on a
mere technicality); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1441-42 (1985).
See also Camara v. San Francisco Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), where the Court created a new
"cost-benefit" standard fcr probable cause based on a balancing of the individual's right to privacy against
the state's need for the intrusion. See id. at 534-35. If the state's interest is greater than the individual's,
then probable cause pursuant to the Fourth Amendment exists. See id.
153. See JAMES A. INCIARDI, THE WAR ON DRUGS: HEROIN, COCAINE, CRIME, AND PUBLIC POLICY
17 (1986). Crime as a major social problem engenders fears of victimization, the need for punishment,
and a cry to deal harshly with criminals. See 2 RACE, CRIME, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 9 (R.L. McNeely
and Carl E. Pope eds., 1981).
154. See MICHAEL D. LYMAN, NARCOTICS AND CRIME CONTROL 21-22, 24, 159-61 (1987).
Reportedly, 81% of felony-related murders involve robbery or illegal drugs. See STATISTICS ON CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT 50-51 (Timothy L. Gall and Daniel M. Lucas eds., 1996). [hereinafter STATISTICS ON
CRIME].
155. Between 1980 and 1987, federal drug prosecutions increased by 153%, and in 1991, arrests
involving drugs or alcohol constituted one-third of all arrests. See INFORMATION PLUS, CRIME: A
SERIOUS AMERICAN PR.3BLEM 105 (Alison Landes et al. eds., 1992). As of 1989, possessors and
traffickers represented roughly 21% to 24% percent of the 395,553 inmates of the nation's county and
municipal jails and an estimated 25% to 35% of the 710,054 inmates serving sentences in the state and
federal prisons. See Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public Policy,
103 YALE L.J. 2593, 2611 (1994) (quoting STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA'S LONGEST
WAR: RETHINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS 179 (1993)).
156. In 1993, an estimated 1.3 million Americans were victims of gun-related crimes, and guns were
involved in 29% of the 4.4 million murders, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults. Use of Firearms
in Violent Crime on Rlse-Study, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), July 10, 1995, at IA, 4A.
Additionally, youthful offenders - a major source of crimes - are often armed with revolvers, semi-
automatic handguns, sawed-off shotguns, military-style automatic, or semi-automatic rifles. See id.
157. The Terry Court was concerned about the number of officers killed in the line of duty and
allowed the stop and frisk based on reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause as a means to allow
officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims. See Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 24 (1968).
In a footnote, the Court expressed its concern about increased violence to police officers:
Fifty-seven law enforcement officers were killed in the line of duty in this country in
1966, bringing the total to 335 for the seven-year period beginning with 1960. Also in
1966, there were 23,851 assaults on police officers, 9,113 of which resulted in injuries to
the policeman. Fifty-five of the 57 officers killed in 1966 died from gunshot wounds, 41
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and inclination to commit violent crimes has become intertwined with race
discrimination,' and the drug and crime problems in America are identified with
poor inner city Blacks who purportedly lack the moral fiber and family structure
necessary to become productive members of society. 59 The volatile and visceral
mixture of a perceived major drug problem, race discrimination, and fear of crime
has contributed to a deterioration of the Fourth Amendment rights of Blacks from
freedom from governmental intrusions.'"
In Black communities'6' across the United States, both the Miranda and Terry
decisions have transcended theoretical discourse. The impossibility of distinguishing
a Terry stop from an arrest has become an exposition of the reality for blacks. The
Terry decision has expanded into multifaceted and discriminatorily imposed obscure
standards where the reasonable person would feel in custody rather than briefly
detained. A vivid example is demonstrated in a reported police practice in Miami,
Florida.
of them inflicted by handguns easily secreted about the person. The remaining two
murders were perpetrated by knives.
Id. at 24 n.21.
158. Perhaps the most glaring example of this position is the political arena because, in politics, race
has always been an American rallying cry for block voter participation. See DERRICK BELL, RACE,
RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw 176-195 (1992). Recall the 1988 presidential campaign of George Bush
when images of Willie Horton - a male of African descent who was convicted of a crime and released
on furlough - were presented to the general public because Horton had victimized a White couple.
Horton's release occurred during the democratic presidential candidacy of Michael Dukakis, who was
then governor of Massachusetts. The Horton scenario was used by the Bush campaign to illustrate
Dukakis' "softness" towards crime and criminals. See DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIME AND THE POLITICS
OF HYSTERIA: How THE WILLIE HORTON STORY CHANGED AMERICAN JUSTICE 205-56 (1995). The
cerebral and visceral connections between race and crime are extremely profound, and most Amer-
ican - regardless of race - if asked to imagine a criminal would conjure up images of a black male.
See JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, BLACK CRIME: A POLICE VIEW 31 (Herrington J. Bryce ed.,
1977); see also Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four and the Theory of Public Choice;
or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About The Right of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079,
1088 (1993) (explaining that legislators responsible for writing criminal codes are prejudiced because
they view themselves more likely to be potential crime victims than suspects).
159. See MATHEA FALCO, THE MAKING OF A DRUG-FREE AMERICA: PROGRAMS THAT WORK 15
(1992).
160. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Gerry
Spence has warned against the elimination of rights of "that other person" in the interests of fighting the
war on drugs when he stated: "At last the new king was crowned when we forgot the lessons of history,
that when the rights of our enemies have been wrested from them, our own rights have been lost as well
for the same rights serve both citizen and criminal." GERRY SPENCE, FROM FREEDOM TO SLAVERY: THE
REBIRTH OF TYRANNY IN AMERICA 7 (1995). Recognition of the injustices that Blacks confront has
generated a perspective that it is both morally and legally appropriate for Blacks to consider race in
reaching jury verdicts in criminal cases. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power
in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 700 (1995).
161. The term "communities" is used rather than "community" because people of African descent
within the United States vary economically, socially, and culturally. It has been eloquently stated that
the Black community is now more of an idea or ideal than a reality. See Regina Austin, 'The Black
Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1817 (1992).
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In Miami, the police have an unwritten pat-down policy which requires certain
persons to remove their shoes during a routine traffic stop. The journalist who wrote
in the newspaper about the unwritten policy wittily titled his article, "These Are The
Times That Try Men's Soles."'" Members of the south Florida communities, Over-
town and Liberty City - both of which are Black and low-income communities -
allege that such stops and searches are done discriminatorily and routinely in their
neighborhoods. One community member stated, "I've heard of them stopping people
on the street in Overtown, and while they're searching them, they make them pull
their pants down, turn their pockets inside out."'"
The primary narrntive in the newspaper article involved a twenty-year-old Liberty
City resident who arrived home around 12:30 a.m. accompanied by a few of his
friends. An officer believed a traffic violation had occurred and he activated his
emergency lights, ordered the individuals out of the car and instructed them to wait
for the arrival of a police backup unit. They complied with an order to put their
hands on the car and they were searched and told to remove their shoes.'" The
individuals perceived the encounter as "the black experience." They articulated a
position of powerlessness when they remarked: "They be beating on people for
nothing. . . .They say, We gonna search you, and you gonna like it.""'  The
residents believe a body search is something the police will do and to resist is futile
and dangerous."
The police indicated that individuals pull down their pants and remove their shoes
in the interests of police safety.67 A female officer involved in the encounter
described the Liberty City procedure as a Terry stop when she stated: "I do [a pat-
down] on everyone for my safety and for other officers' safety."'" She continued,
162. Elise Ackerman, These Are The Times That Try Men's Soles: Does The City Of Miami Police
Department Have A Foot Fetish?, NEw TIMES (Miami), Dec. 22-28, 1994 at 7.
163. Id.
164. See id. Conflicting stories about what occurred after the stop were also discussed in the article.
There were conflicting contentions giving rise to claims of resisting arrest and police brutality. See id.
165. Id. This sense of powerlessness is the Black experience. The economic and political views
shared by the slaveholders, legislators, judges, and other public officials during the American colonial
and antebellum periods continue to plague American today. Judge Higginbotham suggests that both
slavery and today's race relations are divisible into ten beliefs or precepts directed towards Blacks:
inferiority, property, powerlessness, racial purity, manumission and free Blacks, family, education and
culture, religion, liberty, resistance, and by any means possible. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Ten
Precepts ofAmerican Slavery Jurisprudence: Chief Justice Roger Taney's Defense And Justice Thurgood
Marshall's Condemnation of the Precept of Black Inferiority, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 1695, 1697-1701
(1996). In his article, Judge Higginbotham uses the term "precepts" as a list of "basic premises" that
"taken together, could explain the whole institution of colonial and antebellum slavery and the race
relations law of that era," which, he asserts, "still continue to haunt America in 1996." Id. at 1696. He
asserts that the precepts have not been deconstructed by the courts, but that the courts has done a great
deal to perpetuate the first three precepts directed towards Blacks: inferiority, property, and powerless.
See id.
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"Everyone I pat down, their shoes come off. That's all there is to it."'' Another
officer added: "Recently we found a gun in a person's shoe in the jail .... I wouldn't
say it's a policy. It's highly recommended. . .. ""
The perspective of the individuals vis-A-vis the police depicts the practical
difficulty of expanding the scope of a Terry stop. The line between a stop and frisk
and a custodial arrest is blurred when Terry stop and frisks are continually expanded
via force and intimidation based on the catchall notion of concerns for police safety.
A paradigmatic Terry stop and frisk is brief with a low ratio of police to detainees,
and the person is not deprived of his freedom in a manner associated with formal
arrest, i.e., in a significant manner. This is dissimilar from the reality for Black males
in Liberty City or any other city in the United States. Frequently, Blacks are stopped
solely because of the color of their skin and there are numerous police, in several
cars, with a display of force.'
The Liberty City detention is more analogous to the Florida v. Royer"n decision
than to the Terry decision. The issues in Royer arose out of a general public-police
encounter in the Miami International airport. Royer, who fit the drug courier profile,
was approached by two plain-clothes detectives who requested his airline ticket and
driver's license. The officers informed Royer that they suspected him of transporting
narcotics and asked him to accompany them to a room after they failed to return
Royer's ticket and license. They brought Royer's luggage into the room where they
searched it and discovered marijuana. The Supreme Court held that there was
reasonable suspicion based on articulable facts that criminal activity was afoot to
justify the initial stop in the concourse." The Court added that the limits of the
169. Md.
170. Id. The police are allowed to search a person because "someone else" previously concealed
a weapon in a such a manner. This search method defies both probable cause and reasonable suspicion
and police are allowed to search anywhere. The number of intrusions which could result from a
"someone else" methodology are endless. A California court allowed a search of a car's engine
compartment and admitted expert testimony that people typically conceal guns in the engine's
compartment because police seldom search there. See United States v. Webb, 115 F.3d 711, 713 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 429 (1997).
171. See ABC News Prime Time Live: Driving While Black (ABC television broadcast, Nov. 27,
1996). The ABC network conducted a study to determine whether young black men were stopped by
the police more frequently than other members of society for the same offense. The network had three
Black men ride inside an expensive car owned by the father of one of the occupants and placed a camera
inside the car. The driver made a turn at an intersection without using his signal light. Although
hundreds of others, including police cars, also failed to signal before turning the black youths were
singled-out for a traffic stop. The stop was pretextua and the car was thoroughly searched for drugs.
One officer saw a box and stated it probably contained drugs. See id. The recent Whren decision allows
pretextual stops and held that the officer's subjective intent is irrelevant if there is probable cause for the
stop. See Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996). Therefore, officers can legally stop
Blacks because of the failure to signal, although only Blacks are stopped. The problem escapes a legal
solution, and is reduced to a flippant statement that, if people want to avoid a stop, they should signal
at an intersection. For further discussion on race and black motorists, see Greg Williams, Selective
Targeting in Law Enforcement, NAT'L BAR ASS'N MAG., MarJApr. 1996, at 18.
172. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
173. See id. at 497-500.
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Terry stop and frisk were exceeded and Royer was arrested when the officers kept
his belongings and escorted him into the interrogation room." The Court opined
that the officers' conduct was more intrusive than necessary to effectuate an
investigative detention authorized by Terry and stated: "We cannot ... agree that
every nervous young man paying cash for a ticket to New York under an assumed
name and carrying two heavy American Tourister bags may be arrested and held to
answer for a serious felony charge." ' The Court complied with the principles upon
which Terry rested, namely, a special category of seizures approved on less than
probable cause because such seizures are substantially less intrusive than an
arrest. 76
The police practice in Liberty City of removing a detainee's shoes is similar to
Royer, and dissimilar to Terry, because in both Royer and in Liberty City the
detention is tantamount to an arrest. In both scenarios, there is a show of authority
such that a reasonable person would believe he or she is not free to leave, i.e.,
significantly deprived of freedom. There is a threatening police presence of several
officers, a likelihood of weapons displayed, and a tone indicating compulsion.'
n
The Black Liberty City detainee is supposedly "Terry stopped" and the detention
would only require reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause because Terry
stops are brief and minor intrusions. The question becomes whether the detention is
a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment or custody for purpose of the Fifth
Amendment? The history of abuse against Blacks during police encounters, and the
humiliation of removing shoes, and possibly pants, would lead Black males to
reasonably believe there is a police-dominated atmosphere in which the detainee is
surrounded by antagonistic forces. 78 Therefore, the detainees are arrested and
entitled to Miranda warnings.
The Supreme Court, however, would likely deny Miranda warnings for the Liberty
City detainees and decide that the controlling case, which also involved a traffic stop,
is Berkemer v. McCarty. In Berkemer, the Court held that traffic stops, despite
174. See id. at 500.
175. Id. at 507. Justice Brennan, who dissented in part, adopted the viewpoint that Royer's conduct
was innocent and the police lacked both probable cause and reasonable suspicion for the initial stop in
the concord. See id. at 512 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. See United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 690 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice
Marshall stated, "Terry must be justified, not because it makes law enforcement easier, but because a
Terry stop does not constitute the sort of arrest that the Constitution requires be made only upon probable
cause. 'For this reason, in reviewing any Terry stop, the 'critical threshold issue is the intrusiveness of
the seizure," Id. at 691 (Marshall, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 722
(1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring)).
177. In United Stat-3s v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), the Court stated that: "Examples of
circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even when the person did not attempt to leave, would be the
threatening presence of s-veral officers, the display of a weapon by an officer.., or the use of language
or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer's request might be compelled." Id. at 554.
178. The number of police, along with guns, badges and uniforms is inherently coercive. See Illinois
v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990); see also New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655 (1984) (noting
that the lack of a Miranda warning does not raise a presumption that a person is compelled to speak to
law enforcement officer).
179. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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the restrictions placed on the detainee's movements, are more akin to a Terry stop
than to an arrest for purposes of Miranda." The Court specifically stated that the
"noncoercive aspect of ordinary traffic stops prompts us to hold that persons
temporarily detained pursuant to such stops are not "in custody" for the purposes of
Miranda.''. Ordinarily, traffic stops are presumptively temporary, brief, and in
public with one or two police officers."
The Berkemer standard focuses on the "objective" circumstances rather than the
subjective perspective harbored by the police or the person detained and interrogated.
The "objective" standard ignores the reality of the streets and the relationship
between the police and Black Americans. Often, during a Terry stop and frisk, a
detainee is confronted by several police cars and the officers' words and actions leads
the person to reasonably believe that there is a significant restraint on freedom of
movement." The removal of a person's shoes exceeds the minimal intrusion of the
spin and grab in Terry. This practice, without individual suspicion based on
articulable facts, nurtures a sense of powerless and a level of intrusion the framer's
of the Fourth Amendment sought to disallow. Their intent was to establish a
government that did not engage in arbitrary and capricious conduct." 4 The intent
behind the Fourth Amendment was not the automatic authorization to stop and frisk
a person because someone who looked like the person and was in the same
community allegedly had a weapon in his shoe in the past. The officer must have
reasonable suspicion based upon articulable facts that criminal activity is afoot and
a reasonable belief that the particular person is armed and dangerous to conduct a
stop and frisk.'" Considerations of race in routine traffic stops do not automatically
meet this standard. In fact, for Blacks, the phrase "routine traffic stop" is a misnomer
because every stop has the potential for discretion and abuse.'" The following
180. See id. at 439.
181. Id. at 440.
182. See id. at 437-38.
183. See Robert S. Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory,
Post-Structuralism, and Narrative Space, in CRrICAL RACE THEORY 322, 322-23 (Richard Delgado ed.,
1995). Professor Chang describes how he was stopped for suspicion of a stolen vehicle and was detained
by four police officers in a deserted parking lot who failed to apologize after they discovered their
mistake. See id. Professor Chang stated, "I have to carry it with me because of the anger I feel, and
because of the fear - fear of the power that certain people are able to exercise over me because of this
(contingent) [Asian] feature that makes me different." Id. at 323.
184. The degree of force must be reasonably necessary to protect the officer, and the length of the
detention cannot exceed the time necessary to confirm or dispel the officer's reasonable suspicion. See
United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). Furthermore,
the communities' reaction demonstrates a reasonable belief that one is not free to leave. See United States
v. Ocampo, 890 F.2d 1363, 1369 (7th Cir. 1989) (providing that the location, time and reaction of the
detainee are relevant).
185. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30.
186. Traffic stops are inherent with the probability of abuse when an officer can follow Black youths
and wait for a traffic violation - which is not a seizure. See California v. Hodari, 499 U.S. 621, 645
(1991). The pursuit and stop are permissible regardless of the intent of the officer. See Whren v. United
States, 116 S. CL 1769, 1774 (1996). In addition, the officer can search the car with the detainee's
consent without informing the detainees that he can refuse consent for the search, see Schneckloth v.
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traffic stops illustrate the point.
Dr. Mae Jemison graduated from high school with honors, received her
undergraduate degree from Stanford University in 1977, and her medical degree from
Cornell University in 1983. She left her medical practice to join NASA as a mission
specialist to conduct scientific experiments in space. She became the first Black
woman astronaut to travel into space when she traveled aboard the Space Shuttle
Endeavor in 1992 from Kennedy Space Center.
Notwithstanding her educational and scientific accolades, Dr. Jemison's travels in
Texas proved more perilous than her travels in space. She was stopped by a
patrolman in Nassau Bay, Texas, at 8 a.m. on February 24, 1996 for a minor traffic
violation. She had been a resident of the small community for approximately eight
years."g The officer told her that she had committed a minor traffic violation and
obtained her license and insurance information which he carried back to his vehicle.
He returned and ordered Dr. Jemison out of her car and indicated that there was a
warrant for her arrest. She was slammed face-down onto the ground, painfully
handcuffed and forceJ to remove her shoes and walk into the police station barefoot.
She was denied an opportunity to release the car to her seventy-year-old father, and
she was not allowed to gather her personal valuables on the seat of her car left by
the roadside. She indicated that she felt both humiliated and abused. She expressed
concern about whether others were also subjected to such abuse."'
Dr. Jemison's interaction with the police undermines a popular view espoused after
the O.J. Simpson verdict that Blacks lack any reasons to complain because of voting
rights, representation in the House of Representatives, and a proliferation of the
Black middle class and Blacks of stature and achievement."9 Dr. Jemison's
education and achievements did not save her from physical abuse. Her accomplish-
ments did not prevent her from feeling the powerless and dehumanization that most
Blacks experience in police encounters. She experienced the pain, state-backed force,
and abuse that Blacks instinctively anticipate, fear, or challenge when confronted by
the police. While police may 'serve and protect' Whites, Blacks are policed.
Encounters are often followed by a sigh of relief that more harm was not
inflicted."9° Dr. Jemison's perception of whether she was free to go or could disobey
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 232 (1973), or that he is free to go. See Ohio v. Robinette, 117 S. Ct. 417,
421 (1996). Furthermore, the scope of the search is determined by the officer's reasonable belief. See
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251-52 (1991). If all else fails, the officer can continue to detain the
driver for a reasonable time until a narcotics detection dog arrives without probable cause because a dog
sniff is not a search. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
187. See Cathy Connors, Dr. Mae Jernison Was Made to Walk Barefoot, N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEws,
Mar. 16, 1996, at 4, 36.
188. See id.
189. See Roger Rosenblatt, A Nation of Pained Hearts: O.J. Simpson Found Not Guilty in Double
Murder Case, TIME, Oct. 16, 1995 at 40, 43.
190. See ABC News Prime Time Live, supra note 171. A Black occupant of the car in the ABC
experiment said that he did not mind the stop - it was nothing new - he was merely glad that the
police released him unharmed. See id. Nikki Giovanni describes apprehension and surprise while stopped
during a traffic stop by an officer at 3 am. who, instead of harassing her, provided assistance. See NIKKI
GIovANNI, RACISM 101, at 46 (1994). She quipped: "A few years ago whether I was lost or not I would
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a police demand is based on a unique line of historical realities different from the
reasonable person and police-dominated standards articulated in Terry and
Miranda.9' Her only recourse was to file a complaint with the officer's supervisor
alleging the force used was excessive and racially motivated.
In yet another scenario involving a Black woman, a South Carolina State Trooper
in an unmarked car sought to pull over a speeding car driven by a Florida resident,
Sandra Antor. Ms. Antor refused to pull over immediately and the chase lasted seven
minutes at speeds reaching eighty miles per hour. When she stopped, the officer
approached and began shouting. He grabbed her, pulled her out of the car, and threw
her against the car and the ground constantly shouting obscenities." The entire
incident was videotaped. The officer was fired and Ms. Antor pled guilty to
speeding. Appearances imply that the incident ended with the officer's termination
and Ms. Antor's conviction.
A vignette offered by a local South Carolina attorney illustrates a pervasive
acumen which depicted the sense of powerlessness in the Black communities. The
attorney noted that it is often difficult to prove cases of brutality, false arrests and
civil rights violations against law enforcement officials because jurors tend to respect
police officers and discredit the testimony of the complainant. 93 Blacks are aware
have been written up. But we were just two little ol' ladies.... He saw old women." Id. Her stop raises
two questions. Why was she stopped simply for being out at 3 am.? And, what if she were a young
Black man? An example of how the police serve and protect Whites and discredit Blacks is demonstrated
in an incident which involved a Laotian child named Knoerak Sinthasomphone, age fourteen. He was
dazed and had wandered onto a Milwaukee, Wisconsin, street comer. A white adult male explained to
a police officer, who was also white, that the fourteen-year-old was his friend, and that the child was
intoxicated. Despite the protest of Black onlookers, the police allowed the man to depart with the child.
Thirty minutes later, the man killed the child. The child was, in fact, the man's thirteenth victim. The
man's name was Jeffrey Dahmer. Estate of Sinthassomphone v. Milwaukee, 56 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA)
1549, 1565 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 2, 1990).
191. For a discussion on the Terry-seizure and the Miranda-custody standards, see supra notes 82-
90 and accompanying text.
192. See Bad Cops, Good Cops: Videos of Police Brutality Spawn Public Distrust. They Should
Inspire Police Reform, NEWSDAY, Apr. 10, 1996, at A38; see also Jesse J. Holland, Associated Press,
Camera Catches State Trooper Physically Abusing Motorist, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar.
9, 1996. Within a month after the nation observed the abuse Ms. Antor suffered, the nation saw another
video which involved police abuse in California. Enrique Funez and Liticia Gonzalez were among 18
Mexican citizens and undocumented immigrants in a pickup truck speeding from the police on a
California highway at speeds reaching 100 miles per hour for 80 miles. Occupants threw items from the
truck at the police and the truck sideswiped other vehicles during the chase. The chase and apprehension
of the suspects were videotaped by helicopters equipped with television-news cameras. Television
stations around the country showed the police shoving Liticia Gonzalez, face-first, into the truck and
pulling her to the ground by her hair. The incident reeked with excessive force and typified the belief
by Blacks that Blacks and other historically oppressed groups have about the latent, obverse, and
ominous aspects of Terry stop and frisks. See Beating Case Shouldn't Enrich Illegal Immigrants, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 12, 1996, at 15A; Both Sides Speak Out on the Beatings by Deputies: A View
of the Beatings from Mexico City, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Apr. 6, 1996, at B2; Sheriff Vows
"No Cover-up" Probe in Beating of Illegal Immigrants, SAN DIEGO UNioN-TRIB. Apr. 4, 1996, at A3;
Kenneth B. Noble, Video of Beating by 2 Deputies Jolts Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1996, at Al.
193. See South Carolina Taxpayers Pick Up Tab for Claims Against Troopers, HERALD (Rock Hill,
S.C.), Apr. 8, 1996, at 8A. In South Carolina, 724 complaints have been filed against state troopers since
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of the possibility of increased police violence, racism, dehumanization and
deprivation of freedom in a significant manner."
The abuse of police power is not limited to traffic stops. Professor Derrick Bell
summarized the history of Blacks in America when he stated that Black rights and
progress exist to the extent that "whites perceive that their [whites'] interests will
benefit or not suffer any harm."'" Bell's premise was depicted in the behavior of
the state, police and Whites when Susan Smith lost her children and Charles Stuart's
wife was killed.
Susan Smith, a White woman, appeared before America as a twenty-three-year-old
deeply grieved and loving mother who had her two minor children kidnapped by a
Black man when he carjacked her automobile." The nation and her Union, South
Carolina community empathized with her and rallied their efforts to find the missing
boys. The police began to suspect Susan Smith as the culprit, and she later confessed
to killing her two sons by drowning them in a car that she drove into a lake. The
events which occurred before her confession reflect Bell's position. Before her
confession, Black communities were subjected to sweep searches and Black men
were stopped in their front yards, in pizza shops, while walking, in their cars and on
basketball courts. They were subjected to arbitrary and capricious searches. In
numerous instances, they were strip-searched.1 7 The case is a double tragedy of
murder and racism. A White psychologist from South Carolina stated that when
Susan Smith incriminated a Black man, her accusations were plausible to White
1993, and 189 have been Eubstantiated. See i. A larger percentage was substantiated in North Carolina:
215 out of 617. See id.
194. Approximately 66% of Blacks believe that the criminal justice system is racist. See Paul Butler,
Black Jurors: Right to Acquit?, in POSTMORTEM: THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE 38, 42 (Jeffrey Abramsom
ed., 1996). Black and Whites respond markedly different in a 1994 survey when asked the following
question, "Are there any situations you can imagine in which you would approve of a policeman striking
an adult male?" The answer was "yes" at a rate of 76% for Whites and 48% for Blacks. See KATHLEEN
MAGUIRE & ANN L. PASTORE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATIsTICS-1994 152 (1995).
195. DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 50 (1992). Professor Bell indicates that
history reflects three basic points about race and racism in America: (1) progress is cyclical; (2) Blacks
progress when their goals coincide with the needs of Whites; and (3) differences between Blacks and
Whites are resolved through compromises that sacrifice the rights of Blacks. See id. at 8. An ample
illustration of Bell's position is the current trend on issues of racial inequality. For example, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals leld, in Hopwoodv. Texas, 718 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), that the Constitution
does not allow admission preferences for Blacks or Hispanics. See id. at 939. In California, one Black
member of the Board of Regents for the University of California at Los Angeles stated: "It's obvious that
the resegregation of higher education has begun." Amy Wallace, UC Law School Class May Have Only
I Black, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1997, at Al. His statement was in response to California's decision to
eliminate race and gender considerations in the school admission's process. See id. The school
desegregation battle has been fought so long and with such fervor that the NAACP recently announced
that it has begun to reconsider its position of advocacy of public school integration. See Steven A.
Holmes, At N.A.A.C.P., Talk of a Shift on Integration: "Separate But Equal" Wins New Support, N.Y.
TIMES, June 23, 1997, at Al.
196. See Don Terry, A Woman's False Accusation Pains Many Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1994,
at 32.
197. See Peter S. Canellos, Youths Decry Search Tactics, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 14, 1990, at Ip.
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Americans. Black Americans felt that the hoax was another assault on the souls and
honor of Blacks and fostered the stereotypical view that Black men are "other,"
dangerous, and society is safer if they are detained, powerless and incarcerated.'
Charles and Carol Stuart were expecting a child and were leaving a childbirth class
going home to a Boston suburb.' Charles Stuart was a thirty-year-old fur company
executive. He told the police that he and his wife stopped at a traffic light and an
armed Black man in a jogging suit forced his way into their car, robbed them, and
shot both of them. Charles Stuart was seriously wounded from a gun shot in the
stomach, while both Carol Stuart and the baby died despite a emergency caesarean
delivery. America identified with the victimized Charles Stuart as his frantic call
from his car to the police dispatcher proclaimed his fear and agony. An endearing
letter written from his hospital bed was read at the his wife's and baby's funerals as
a portrait of his sincere love.
The death of a pregnant White woman and unborn child shot by a Black man
prompted swift public reaction: the police conducted mass sweeps of Black
communities, the Mayor called for the assistance of every available detective,
politicians called for a reinstatement of the death penalty in Massachusetts, and a
business leader offered a substantial reward for the capture of the assailant.2"
Numerous Black men were searched and seized, one of whom was thirty-nine-year-
old William Bennett. The police charged Mr. Bennett for the crimes after Charles
Stuart reviewed photographs of possible suspects. Eventually, Charles Stuart's story
began to unravel. When he became the focus of the investigation, he committed
suicide?'
In both the Susan Smith and Charles Stuart hoaxes, the press and public reactions
revealed more about the general public than about the would-be suspects. Whites
were angry that White women and children were killed, and sought a culprit to
answer for the crime. The White majority adopted the utilitarian notion that the
temporary suspension of the rights of Blacks was necessary, and in the common
good, to apprehend and punish the guilty Black assailant. The culprits were Susan
Smith, Charles Stuart, and a society which was willing to blame Black men solely
because of their skin color. If society embraces the belief that Blacks are inherently
guilty, and the police are members of society, then it is reasonable to believe that the
encounters between Blacks and the police are plagued with problems.
The Smith and Stuart crimes involved a crisis in which society blamed Blackness.
In Jefferson Parish, New Orleans, a crisis was not necessary, Blackness sufficed. The
sheriff in that suburb gave an order that Blacks in White neighborhoods were "up to
no good," and that his officers could seize and search any Black on the "wrong side
of town."2" In support of his position, the sheriff, a Chinese American, said that
198. See Terry, supra note 196, at 32.
199. See Peter J. Howe, From Nightmare to Reality, A City is Reeling: The Stuart Murder Case,
BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 7, 1990, at 1; Canellos, supra note 197.
200. See Katheryn K. Russell, The Racial Hoax as Crime: The Law as Affirmation, 71 IND. L.J.
593, 596 (1996).
201. See id,
202. J. Michael Kennedy, Sheriff Rescinds Order to Stop Blacks in White Areas, L.A. TIMEs, Dec.
19971
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
seventy-nine percent of all robberies were committed by Blacks and seventy-three
percent of the victims were White.'
The sheriff rescinded the order the following day, but his statements reveal a
societal prejudice towards Blacks. He ordered a Terry stop and frisk of all Blacks
in White neighborhoods even though the police lacked reasonable suspicion or
probable cause. The detentions and searches were based solely on race in violation
of the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizures.
Despite the 175 years that the Fourth Amendment has existed, he unilaterally
determined that race was more determinative than probable cause or reasonable
suspicion. His racial prejudice was issued as an order for an entire police department
and enforceable by the full powers of the state. He dehumanized Black communities,
perpetuated racial polarization, and fostered tension between the police and the Black
communities. At a minimum, he espoused views shared by the general public.'
E. Shortcomings of Current Law
The above scenarios demonstrate that Blacks believe that the police fail to enforce
the law, and merely enforce the social, economic and political interests of Whites."5
Professor Paul Butler provides a profound and revealing personal story about his first
police encounter which typifies the Black experience. When he was ten years old he
rode his bike in an all-White neighborhood and a white officer drove his car next to
him and asked if the bike belonged to him. The youthful Butler replied that it did,
and, as he sped away, he asked the officer if the police car belonged to the officer.
When Butler got home he related the story to his mother who spanked him and
asked, "Didn't [you] know what happened to black boys who talked to the police like
that?"
Butler appropriately notes that this experience is considerably different for the
White person, who recalls how the police were nice when they came to get the cat
out of the tree.' This fear for the Black youth by a parent was echoed by a mother
who demands that her son only drive a station wagon lest the police stop and
possibly abuse him as a Black youth in a luxurious automobile."
4, 1996, at 18.
203. See id.
204. In Philadelphia, when the police sought a stalker they stopped several hundred Black men and
arrested 60 others. See Nat Hentoff, Forgetting the Fourth Amendment in Philadelphia, WASH. POST,
Apr. 16, 1988, at A25. The detentions were allegedly without probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
See id.
205. When Blacks wiere asked if they had a "great deal" of confidence in the police, the national
average for positive responses was 58%, while 63% of Whites and 26% of Blacks responded positively.
See MAGUIRE & PASTOp.E, supra note 151, at 147. Conversely, when asked if they had "very little"
confidence in the police, the national average was 10%, while 8% of Whites and 32% of Blacks
responded positively. See id.
206. See Butler, supra note 160, at 40. Historically, police officers have informally distributed their
own on-the-street justice for Blacks. See TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE
KING YEARS 1954-63, at 22 (1988).
207. See Butler, supra note 160, at 40.
208. See ABC News Prime Time Live, supra note 171.
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The perception is that society and the police place a low value on the life of
Blacks.' Following the turmoil from the St. Petersburg, Florida riots in October
1996 and the acquittal of a White police officer in the death of a Black motorist
in Brentwood, Pennsylvania, a Black woman who protested stated: "I love my
country .. . but I don't think my country loves me. I respect authority, but
authority doesn't respect me." ' Blacks particularly felt that their views had
credibility due to remarks made during the OJ. Simpson trial when officer Mark
Fuhrman stated, "anything out of a n ----'s mouth is a f---ing lie.""' He added,
"if you did the things that they teach you in the academy, you'd never get a f---ing
thing done."2 ' Officer Fuhrman's statements were no surprise to Blacks who
firmly believe that White officers hate Blacks and will violate civil rights and
tamper with evidence if convinced it is necessary."' With such a belief system
about police, how can a Terry stop for Blacks possibly rely upon a reasonable
person standard? Blacks have a unique and subjective set of experiences during
police encounters which are beset in invasive conduct and invective words. There
is an attempt to ignore this question by characterizing the issue as "playing the
race-card."1 4 This term has awkward connotations because it suggests that, if
race is injected into the dialogue, the advocate is playing a game and behaving
underhandedly because the veritable issue is something else. The problem with this
209. Richard Wright expressed the anger and frustration of Blacks in 1945 when he stated that
White America has reduced Black life to a level of crude and brutal quality. See Richard Wright,
Introduction to ST. CLAIRE DRAKE & HORACE R. CAYTON, BLACK METRoPoLIs: A STUDY OF NEGRO
LIFE IN A NORTHERN CITY at xxxiv (1945), cited in A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., & William C. Smith,
The Hughes Court and the Beginning of the End of the "Separate But Equal" Doctrine, 76 MINN. L.
REV. 1099, 1130 n.135 (1992). The devaluation of Black life was mocked in a skit conducted by police
officers. In Fort Lauderdale, Florida, a white police officer attended a gathering in Tennessee called the
"Good 0' Boy Roundup" and performed a skit in which he beat a black baby doll with a police baton.
See Scott Glover, Black Officers' Group Supports Detective's Dismissal Over Skit, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft.
Lauderdale), June 21, 1996, at 2B.
210. See Robyn Meredith, In Pittsburgh, White Officer's Acquittal Brings Protest March, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 15, 1996, at B8.
211. See Mark Whitaker, Whites v. Blacks, (Race Relations; O.J. Simpson Murder Trial.) (Special
Report: The Verdict), NEWSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, at 28.
212. Id.
213. Ironically, Fuhrman's remarks were downgraded by the State and eventually quelled by the
public's efforts to deal with O.J., who appeared guilty - despite his acquittal. The public sentiment was
that it was a trial for murder and racism was irrelevant. Besides, O.J. got away with murder and it was
his lawyer who underhandedly played the race-card. See Johnnie L. Cochran Jr., Courting Greatness on
a Journey to Justice, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 2, 1995, at 6. In response to the allegation
that he played the race card, Cochran stated: "The race card. That is the most preposterous thing in the
world. First of all, it is preposterous to talk about an African American playing the race card in
America." Id. In addition, as Bill Cosby said: "Whose deck is it? Who dealt the deck? What are we
talking about?" Id. at 9.
214. Officer Fuhrman's remarks during the O.J. Simpson trial were perceived as an irregular
occurrence with limited significance. This view is sharply criticized by critical race scholars who
advocate there is no scholarly perch outside the social dynamics of race to discuss the American legal
system. See KIMBERLE CRENSHAW ET AL, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITING THAT FORMED
THE MOVEMENT xiii (1995).
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position is that it propounds an objective truth,2t5 and reduces the problem of
racism to subjectivity and a game. The Supreme Court has fallen into this trap,
perpetuating the race problem within the criminal justice system, through its
rhetoric of framer's intent and color-blindness."6
The emphasis on color-blind constitutionalism was articulated in Plessy v. Fer-
guson,217 when the Court indicated that Jim Crow laws were neutral in the
enforcement of racial separation and that "our Constitution is colorblind. 2 0 The
notion of color-blind constitutionalism advances the position that laws are drafted
and the Constitution is interpreted without consideration of race because the law is
neutral, objective and fair.219 For example, in Whren v. United States, 20 the
Court unequivocally stated that an officer's subjective intentions during a traffic
stop, even if based on racist intent, are irrelevant for reasonable suspicion or
probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis.' Justice Scalia wrote the opinion
and added the punctilio: "We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution
prohibits selective enforcement of the law based on considerations of race."' This
statement by Justice Scalia provides form without substance because neither the
Fourth Amendment nor the Equal Protection Clause provides an actual remedy for
race-based Terry stop and frisk.' Concerning the Fourth Amendment, Justice
215. This so-called objective truth is itself "hidden in subjectivities and unexamined claims." See
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHT 11 (1991).
216. The term "franrer's intent," among others, is often used to continue the disenfranchisement of
certain groups. See LESuE BENDER & DAN BRAvEMAN, POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL RiGHTs
READER 138-41 (1995).
217. 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
218. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 550. The Court stated:
Legislation is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon
physical differences and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the
difficulties of the present situation. If the civil and political rights of both races be equal
on cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically. If one race be inferior to the other
socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane.
Id. at 551-52. The Rehnquist Court has decided several cases along the lines of color-blind
constitutionalism. See Miller v. Johnson, 512 U.S. 900 (1995); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515
U.S. 200 (1995); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992),
cited in Panel Discussicn, Conference on Race, Law, and Justice: The Rehnquist Court and The
American Dilemma, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 567, 569-70 (1996); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237
(1991).
219. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 CoLUM. L. Rev. 1060, 1077
(1991); see also Jeffrey Rosen, The Color-Blind Court, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 791, 791 (1996) ("In the
remarkable race cases of 1995, four Justices - Clarence Thomas, Antonin Scalia, William Rehnquist
and Anthony Kennedy - committed themselves to the principle that government can almost never
classify citizens on the basis of race.").
220. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
221. See id. at 1774
222. Id.
223. The position ignores the reality that part of the form that discrimination takes is depicted in
the current socio-politifad climate in which it has become more difficult to recognize and prove
discrimination. See PATRICIA J. WILLiAmS, THE ROOSTER's EGG 135 (1995); see also John 0. Calmore,
Exploring Michael Omi's "Messy" Real World of Race: An Essay for "Naked People Longing to Swim
Free," 25 LAW & INEQ. J. 25, 30 (1977) (arguing that the law narrows and hides the areas where
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Scalia himself added: "But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally
discriminatory application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth
Amendment analysis."' This statement disembodies the Fourth Amendment,
particularly when the Supreme Court has indicated that race is relevant as a factor
in the probable cause and reasonable suspicion analyses to detain a person.'
Scalia also ignores the trend in lower courts to consider race as relevant in
determining whether a stop is reasonable. In Arizona v. Dean,' the police drove
through residential neighborhoods in unmarked cars looking for "suspicious activity."
It was afternoon when they noticed a person in a parked car who "looked Mexican"
and appeared nervous.2 They asked the motorist for identification and for consent
to search. Inside the trunk they saw a television and read the occupants their Miranda
rights.'m The motorist was released, but arrested a couple of hours later when the
police learned that an apartment in the area had been burglarized that afternoon. The
television was taken from that apartment. A visceral reaction is "no-harm-no-foul" -
the guilty were caught and the end justifies the means. The problem with this
approach is that all Mexicans, and other vulnerable communities, are supposed to
relinquish their rights against unreasonable searches and seizures for the common
good. Scalia asserts that race or subjective intent plays no part in Fourth Amendment
analysis. The officer's statement demonstrated something to the contrary when he
stated: "He [the motorist] didn't look, I mean . . . he was a Mexican male in a
predominantly white neighborhood of... oh, middle to upper-class people .... "'
Consequently, race itself becomes an articulable fact in the determination of whether
reasonable suspicion exist.
Scalia's remark that subjective intent is inimical to Fourth Amendment analysis
also ignores the politics of race in the criminal justice system. New York City
experienced two events which demonstrate that considerations of race are alive and
well in the criminal justice system. The first event involved district attorney, Robert
T. Johnson, who refused to seek the death penalty against Angel Diaz, a twenty-
eight-year-old Hispanic man accused of the shooting death of a New York City
police officer.2 ' Governor George Pataki removed District Attorney Johnson from
freedom is sought).
224. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774.
225. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 886-87 (1975). Suspicion to stop and frisk
is often based on conduct resembling a crime or guilt, the environment in which the police observe the
person, and the person's characteristics (which include race). See Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the
Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L. J. 214, 218 (1983).
226. See United States v. Harington, 636 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
McClain, 452 F. Supp. 195, 199 (E.D. Mich. 1977). In United States v. Weaver, 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir.
1992), Chief Judge Arnold argued, in his dissenting opinion, that he was unprepared to state that race
is never relevant. See id. at 397 (Arnold, CJ., dissenting).
227. 543 P.2d 425 (Ariz. 1975).
228. See id. at 426-27.
229. See id. at 426.
230. Id. at 439.
231. See Rachel L. Swains, Grand Jury Indicts Man in Shooting Death of a Police Officer, N.Y.
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the case and replaced him with Attorney General Dennis C. Vacco, who immediately
indicated that there was strong evidence for seeking the death penalty." Any
reference to Angel Dia2's race and the likelihood of discrimination is met with lofty
cries of prosecutorial discretion and separation of powers. 3
The second event which occurred in New York City involved a ruling by Judge
Harold Baer, Jr. of the Federal District Court of New York. The case involved a
Black woman who, along with a few men, loaded her car with duffle bags at 5 a.m.
in a high crime neighborhood. When confronted by the police, the men ran. Judge
Baer found that there was neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion for the
detention and suppressed the eighty pounds of cocaine and heroin the police found
in the woman's trunk. His view was that the stop was improper because Blacks
loading a car at 5 a.m. in a high crime area is insufficient grounds to conclude that
criminal activity is afoot."s His critics sharply disagreed. The line of separation of
powers and discretion, which was honored when it was time to prosecute Angel Diaz,
was obliterated when the judge's decision was criticized by President Clinton, Sen.
Bob Dole, New York Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani, and United States Attorney Mary
Jo White. ' Judge Baer eventually held another hearing and reversed his decision
that the evidence should be suppressed.27
Scalia's reference to the Equal Protection Clause as the constitutional basis for
objecting to intentional discrimination is enfeebled by the Court's decisions in
Washington v. Davis, 8 McClesky v. Kemp, 39 and United States v. Armstrong.Y
The three cases demonstrate the Court's position on an equal protection claim during
the 1970s through the 1990s. In its interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause,
which declares that no state shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws,"the Burger Court in 1976 decided Davis and focused on
the actor, rather than on the impact of discrimination on the victim."2 The Court
TIMEs, Apr. 17, 1996, at B12.
232. See id
233. Recall, in resp nse to the statistical data iri McCleskey, that Justice Powell responded: "Where
the discretion that is fundamental to our criminal process is involved, we decline to assume that what
is unexplained is invidicus." See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 313 (1987).
234. See Criminal Procedure Drugs Suppressed Due to Improper Stop, N.Y.L.J,, Feb. 6, 1996, at
25.
235. See id
236. Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of
Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 457 n.360 (1996).
237. United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211, 212 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); see John M. Goshko &
Nancy Reckler, Controversial Drug Ruling Reversed; N.Y. Judge Now Finds Evidence Admissible, WASH.
PosT, Apr. 2, 1996, at Al; Katherine Q. Seelye, Dole Rejects Chief Justice's Criticism of Politicians Who
Scold Judges for their Rulings, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1996, at A12; Henry J. Reske, A Duffel Bag of
Controversy for Judge, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 32. Several judges dnd Justice Rehnquist came to Baer's
aid and warned against politicians meddling in judges decisions. The question becomes: how would the
same politicians have acted if the suspects were White?
238. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
239. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
240. 116 S. Ct. 1480 (1996).
241. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
242. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 242-43. Following the Davis decision, the Court in Village ofArlington
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held that it is insufficient to show that the impact of certain conduct by the actor is
racially disproportionate? The claimant must also show discriminatory intent.'
Approximately a decade after the Davis decision, the Court decided McClesky. In
that case, the prosecutors sought the death penalty in seventy percent of the cases
when the defendant was Black and the victim was White, yet the same prosecutors
sought the death penalty in thirty-two percent of the cases when the killer was White
and the victim was Black.us Regardless of the statistical data, the Court found that
there was insufficient evidence to establish racial discrimination for an equal
protection claim'" The Court reinforced the Davis and McClesky decisions with
the 1996 Armstrong decision. In Armstrong, the Court considered whether a
defendant who claims selective prosecution based on race is entitled to discovery. 7
The Black defendants argued that they were prosecuted for crack cocaine related
charges in federal court rather than state court, which mandated a lesser term of
imprisonment. 8 The Court replied that a presumption exists that a prosecutor has
not violated equal protection. To overcome this presumption, the defendant must
present clear evidence to the contrary that the federal prosecution had a
discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose." The
defendant had to demonstrate - without the benefit of discovery - that the
government failed to prosecute similarly situated suspects of other race
Despite Scalia's reference to the Equal Protection Clause, excessive policing is
virtually impossible to prove because a claimant must show that Blacks are
disproportionately and unjustifiably subjected to "stop and frisk" and that such stops
are racially motivated. The statistics would have to come from law enforcement
officers, who collect statistics on the number of police officers assaulted but do not
collect statistics on the number of people stopped or injured by the police. Moreover,
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), held that disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but is not solely determinative. See id. at 264-65. The Davis and Arlington Heights decisions
reflect the Court's approach in addressing racism as an isolated incident by a few deviant individuals.
This approach assumes we live in a colorblind society and ignores the possibility that non-purposeful
conduct may foster an perpetuate racial discrimination. The other interpretative perspective is the
antisubjugation one, which focuses on the impact on the victim rather than the conduct of the actor. See
Omar Saleem, Overcoming Environmental Discrimination: The Need for a Disparate Impact Test and
Improved Notice Requirements in Facility Siting Decisions, 19 COLUM. J. ENvTL. L. 211, 226 (1994)
(relying heavily upon Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color,
Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REv. 1419 (1991)).
243. See Davis, 426 U.S. at 239.
244. See id.
245. See McClesky, 481 U.S. at 287.
246. See id. at 292-97; cf. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 n.13 (1977) ("If a disparity is
sufficiently large, then it is unlikely that it is due solely to chance or accident and, in the absence of
evidence to the contrary, one must conclude that racial or other class-related factors entered into the
selection process.").
247. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1483 (1996).
248. See id.
249. See id. at 1486-87.
250. See id. at 1486-88.
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jurors generally want to acquit police in misconduct cases"' and the Supreme Court
has generally presumed that police officers act in good faith.'
While neither the Fourth Amendment nor the Equal Protection Clause provides
protection against Terry stop and frisk, the mistreatment of Black detainees
continues.' Professor Patricia Williams articulated the Black pain when she stated:
"Blacks who are treated as 'suspect profiles' at best suffer a range of abuses in
contacts with the justice system that go from negligence to outright brutality."'
Such abuses are part of a level of prejudice that the Supreme Court is willing to
tolerate for fear of disrupting American "values" imbedded in the legal and political
systems.' 5
11. Solutions: Terry Expanded and Racial Conflict
The Terry trilogy involved grabs, spins, pursuits and frisks of outer garments. The
intrusions were based on reasonable suspicion and involved reasonable police force
and a reasonable length of time for the Terry stop. This has changed as the federal
courts have begun to expand police force during a Terry stop to include guns,
handcuffs and chained legs. During the expansion of Terry, the Supreme Court
has been reluctant to assume a leadership role to direct the lower federal courts.
Instead, the Supreme Court has insisted upon a reasonableness case-by-case approach
251. See Mark Cuniden, When Good Cops Go Bad, A.B.A. J., May 1996, at 62-64.
252. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 812 (1984); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 445
(1984).
253. In addition to the Equal Protection Clause and the Fourth Amendment, reference has been made
to the Due Process Claure as a remedy for selective race-based Terry stops. In United States v. Taylor,
956 F.2d 572 (6th Cir. 1992), the court determined that both the defendant's initial encounter with the
police and the search of his luggage was consensual. See id. at 578-59. Therefore, the court decided that
it was unnecessary to consider whether the surveillance or drug courier profile was based on race. See
id. If race were considered, the court stated that there would have been violations of defendant's equal
protection and due process rights. See iL
254. Patricia J. Williams, America and The Simpson Trial, NATION, Mar. 13, 1995, at 337. The
abuse and harassment is evident in the fact that Blacks and Hispanics are more likely than Whites to be
released after a police detention due to the weak grounds for the detention. See Ronald Weitzer, Racial
Discrimination in the C0iminal Justice System, 24 J. CRIM. JuST. 309, 311 (1996).
255. See Developments in the Law - Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1472,
1493 (1988); see also John 0. Calmore, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers: Contemporary
Proceedings, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1764, 1776 (1993) (stating that racism has "disappeared except
as it [is] 'imagined' by its subordinated subjects, who [continue] to 'suffer' in an unbelievable world -
a color blind world of white innocence"). The Supreme Court is embracing legal concepts and has
applied them without sufficient consideration of their practical impact. Such a possibility was shunned
by Justice Frankfurter when he noted that, although theoretical discourse has it place, "the Constitution
is intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not to maintain theories." Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (quoting Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904)). See also PATRICIA J.
WILUiAMs, THE ALCHmtY OF RACE AND RIGzHTs 8-10 (1991) (indicating that legal understanding and
social concerns should not be oxymoronic). In addition, recall McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819) in which Chief Justice Marshall cautioned the Court to remember it is expounding
the Constitution. See id. at 407.
256. Ironically, stop-and-frisk has expanded so widely that "those who would oppose wider police
power must prove this should not be so." Harris, supra note 54, at 36.
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for search and seizures with the caveat that the appropriate remedies for Fourth
Amendment violations are the exclusionary rule and the Equal Protection clause -
each of which has proved inadequate. In effect, the law of search and seizure has
failed to reach the framers' aspirations, and has been reduced to gilded soliloquies
espousing notions of law and order and police safety at the expense of individual
rights. Issues of racism are ignored and the Court has fostered a tyranny of labels
such as "reasonable person," "reasonableness," and "color blind constitutionalism."
The Supreme Court should take a more affirmative role to protect individual rather
than state rights.'
Excellent suggestions have been offered to address the increased force and racism
which plagues current Terry stop and frisk. Professor Tracey Maclin has proposed
that the Court consider the race of the person in the police encounter to determine
whether the encounter is a seizure s Maclin concedes that the thesis would raise
objections about race consciousness in a society focused on colorblindness of the
law.' Maclin responds with Justice Blackmun's remark that "[iun order to get
beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. '
Maclin then addresses the claim that a race conscious proposal would create
affirmative action for Black males with the truism that Black males would simply
receive what the Fourth Amendment already guarantees."' Finally, Maclin
confronts the strongest criticism of a race-conscious proposal, which is that it relies
too heavily on the subjective perceptions of Blacks. This focus, Maclin contends, is
appropriate because "it makes no sense to devise Fourth Amendment rules as if we
lived in a nation where there are no differences among us."' Maclin suggests that
police could be trained to keep abreast of minority groups' perceptions of police
behavior and tactics.'
Maclin's thesis, while appealing, appears unworkable. The police would determine
the nature and scope of a detention based upon the racial background of the detainee.
Along with the existence of a familiar ring, such a position raises the concern about
a police error. Would mistaken ethnicity become another exception to the
257. The Court's emphasis on state rights rather than individual rights was apparent from the cases
it decided at its session on June 23, 1997. See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2384 (1997)
(striking down congressional legislation on gun control as violative of state sovereignty); Reno v. ACLU,
117 S. Ct. 2329, 2350 (1997) (striking down a federal statute on the grounds that Congress exceeded its
powers); Texas v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (holding that Congress overreached in enacting
the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act because the Act contradicts vital principles necessary to
maintain separation of powers and federal balance); Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2261
(1997) (allowing a state prohibition against causing or aiding suicide); Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S. Ct.
2072, 2076 (1997) (allowing a state to detain people who are unable to control their behavior and thereby
pose a danger to the public health and safety).
258. See Maclin, supra note 74, at 268-69.
259. See id. at 270-72.
260. Id. at 270 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
261. See id. at 272.
262. Id at 274 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
263. See id (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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exclusionary rule? Furthermore, America's color line has become more diverse and
complex than Black and White, with twenty-five percent of the population identified
as "of color."' Th-, State of California has a population of thirty-three percent
Hispanic, and forty percent Asian.2" The officer would become authorized to
determine the race, socio-economic, and political background of each detainee, a task
some detainee's themselves grapple with daily. Maclin acknowledges the problem in
the thesis with the statement: "Asking a police officer to decide or guess whether a
person feels free to leave would require predictive skills that neither the police nor
anyone else possesses. ' Maclin's thesis would also clash with the current color-
blind constitutional Supreme Court, which itself offers an unworkable solution based
on the exclusionary rule, Equal Protection Clause and due process. Attorney Johnnie
Cochran expressed the sentiment of the Court when he stated: "If you go to the
Supreme Court now, you're told that race can never be used to benefit anyone. It can
only be used to punish." '
Maclin's position that Blacks perceive and experience police encounters differently
from Whites was alo addressed by Professor David Harris, who states that police
have the power and discretion to stop and frisk and this power is often exercised
disproportionately toward Blacks.' Harris offered three proposals to resolve the
problem. First, Harris proposes a return to the pre-Terry or probable cause standard.
Harris states: "If stops and frisks based only on location and avoidance of police seem
questionable under the reasonable suspicion standard, they would be even more so
under the probable cause standard and therefore likely found unconstitutional."'
Harris perceives the return to pre-Terry as rather unlikely under the current Supreme
Court Justices.'3 Second, Harris suggests a recalibration of Terry which would force
courts to require greater evidence before finding reasonable suspicion."7' Harris
perceives this solution as unworkable because subtle changes would prove ineffective
and the balancing process would remain intact'"3 Harris' third proposal, advanced
as his strongest, is to make the combination of innocent and necessary behavior a
constitutionally protected activity insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion."3
264. See John J. Calmore, Exploring Michael Omi's "Messy" Real World of Race: An Essay For
"Naked People Longing To Swim Free," 15 LAW & INEQ. J. 25, 56-57 (1997).
265. See id.
266. Maclin, supra note 74, at 273.
267. Mr. Cochran's comment appeared in the following article: Steven Keeva, A Bumpy Road to
Equality, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1996, at 32.
268. See Davis A. Harris, Factorsfor Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor Means Stopped
and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 679 (1994).
269. Id. at 682.
270. See id. at 634. He mentions that the only Justice who might consider a pre-Terry standard is
Justice Scalia. See id. This is based on Scalia's emphasis in Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366
(1992) (Scalia, J., concurring), that pre-Terry law supports a stop, but there is no support for a frisk
unless the person is arreted. See id. at 380-82 (Scalia, J., concurring).
271. See Harris, supra note 268, at 684.
272. See id.
273. See id. at 685.
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This third proposal comports with the framer's intent, and attorney Otis' legal
argument, to protect the general public against unreasonable searches and
seizuresY4 The third proposal, however, appears indistinguishable from the first in
both substance and its likelihood of success. The protection of innocent and
necessary activity as constitutionally protected activity is a pre-Terry position if we
presume that "protection" means certain police interference with the activity would
require probable cause. In addition, the third proposal, similar to the first, runs
counter to the current trend of cases decided by the Supreme Court. Harris is aware
of this point in his mention275 of United States v. Sokolow. 6 In Sokolow, the
Defendant was in an airport and wore gold, appeared nervous, travelled under an
alias, paid for his ticket with cash, and went to a "drug source" city, Miami, for only
forty-eight hours.m' The Court acknowledged that the defendant's conduct in an
airport was legal, but the Court held that the conduct established reasonable
suspicion." Harris provides that his third proposal would not require the Court to
overrule Sokolow because "no activity in Sokolow is both innocent and necessary, in
the sense that being at one's home or place of work is necessary." '79 The
shortcomings of determining innocent and necessary activity is that the determination
is reached after the invasion. The police would have to stop and frisk to determine
whether the conduct is innocent.
Along with the Sokolow decision, the innocent and necessary standard also
conflicts with the Terry decision, which allowed Officer McFadden to stop and frisk
Terry to determine if his conduct was innocent and reasonable.' Finally, the
standard is at odds with recent Supreme Court decisions such as Maryland v.
Wilson,"' which allowed the police to order passengers out of stopped cars,' and
Ohio v. Robinette,' which allowed the police to search a person's car without first
informing him that he was free to leave.' In both cases, the person was engaged
in innocent and necessary conduct and the police lacked both reasonable suspicion
and probable cause.
Both Maclin and Harris provide useful insight into a major problem: racism and
the police practices during a stop and frisk. Their scholarship is vital because race
and the problems inherent in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence are seldom discussed
in the same genre. The current stop and frisk standards are plagued with problems
concerning reasonableness, increased police force and racial discrimination. Each of
274. For a discussion about the framers' intent and attorney Otis' legal position, see supra notes 13-
17 and accompanying text.
275. See Harris, supra note 268, at 667.
276. 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
277. See id. at 4.
278. See id. at 9.
279. Harris, supra note 268, at 687.
280. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
281. 117 S. Ct. 882 (1997).
282. See id. at 884.
283. 117 S. Ct. 417 (1996).
284. See id. at 419.
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the concerns is inextricably linked to the other. A viable solution of the problems is
for the Court to limit the expansion of a Terry stop. This would curtail the expansion
of the reasonableness standard and protect the rights of the general public.
The expansion of Terry stops to include guns and handcuffs has created an overlap
with Miranda because it is difficult to know when a seizure ends and a custodial
arrest begins. Professor Mark Godsey argues that options such as Miranda warnings,
while inapplicable to all Terry stop encounters, are applicable to Terry stops that
become custodial, thereby returning Terry to its intended contours.' The possibility
of extending Miranda warnings to Terry stops has precipitated debate. Opponents
claim that Miranda applies to custodial interrogation and extending Miranda
warnings to Terry stops would adversely impact Miranda's bright-line rule.' They
add their fear that the terms "custody" and "interrogation" would become ambiguous
and an involuntary standard for interrogations would resurface.' It is further
argued that the cost of Miranda warnings for Terry stops would encumber the police,
yield fewer confessions, discourage individuals from cooperating with the police,
endanger an investigation and lessen the deterrent impact of Terry.'
United States v. SmithS and United States v. Perdue' are often cited as
examples of the ills of applying Miranda warnings to Terry stops."' In both cases,
the Seventh and Tenth Circuits held that the detention of the persons was so intrusive
that the individuals were in custody rather than seized.' The holdings in Smith and
Perdue have been criticized as an improper application of Miranda. The criticism is
that the Perdue cas,-, for example, failed to discuss how custody applies to Terry
stops, specific elements to examine to know when an intrusion has gone beyond
brevity and a limited intrusion, and future guidance.'
This criticism of Perdue is misplaced. There is no need to apply custody to Terry
stops. The Perdue court simply followed Terry, which itself involved a limited
intrusion. The future guidance for Terry stop and frisk is in the Terry decision itself.
A discussion about the woes of applying Miranda to a Terry stop fails to ack-
nowledge that current police encounters are not Terry stops because of the increased
use of police force. Once the police use guns and handcuffs, their encounter is
considerably different than the conduct between the suspects and Officer McFadden
in Terry.
285. See Mark A. Godsey, "When Terry Met Miranda. Two Constitutional Doctrines Collide, 63
FORDHAM L. REV. 715, 734-47 (1994).
286. See Note, Custodial Engineering: Cleaning up the Scope of Miranda Custody During Coercive
Terry Stops, 108 HAItv. L. REV. 665, 678 (1995).
287. See id. Although Miranda changed the law of custodial interrogations from a voluntariness
standard to a bright-line test, the former standard is operative for a due process inquiry. See Colorado
v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 159 (1986).
288. See Note, supra note 286, at 678.
289. 3 F.3d 1088 (7th Cir. 1993).
290. 8 F.3d 1455 (10th Cir. 1993).
291. For a discussion of Smith and Perdue, see supra notes 133-42 and accompanying text.
292. See Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1465; Smith, 3 F.3d at 1098.
293. See Note, Cri'ninal Law - Exclusionary Rule - Tenth Circuit Holds Miranda Warning
Applicable to Terry Stops - United States v. Perdue, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1831, 1834 (1994).
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The Supreme Court can effectively remedy the reasonableness, race and increased
police force issues in the encounters which lower courts have characterized as Terry
stops if the Court takes the initiative and provides clear guidance to distinguish a
Terry stop from and arrest This could be accomplished in a "colorblind" fashion if
the Court restricts the expansion of Terry. A limitation on the force used in a Terry
stop would comport with the framers' intent that individuals remain free from
unreasonable searches and seizures and indirectly address the reasonableness and race
concerns inherent in Terry stops. The Court would move from the mythical world
of Bilbo and the wizard, where racism does not exist and everyone is reasonable, into
the proper role of expounding the constitutional rights of all Americans.

